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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY 
 
My dissertation consists of three essays focusing on unemployment insurance (UI) and 
how it affects recipients.  The first essay examines how UI generosity affects the search 
intensity of recipients through matching American Time Use Survey respondents to all of 
their observations in the Current Population Survey (CPS), the population from which 
they are drawn.  Earnings from the CPS are then run through a benefit calculator that 
determines eligibility and benefit amounts which are used to determine how UI 
generosity affects search times.  The second essay uses the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation to examine how lesser known policies affecting UI eligibility of 
workers with limited earnings histories, part-time workers, voluntary job leavers, and 
expanding benefit amounts for individuals with children affect unemployment duration.  
The third essay examines how liquidity constraints affect the consumption smoothing 
benefits of UI.  Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968-2012, I find that 
the consumption smoothing benefits of UI that past studies have found are primarily 
concentrated on the 27% of households that do not have other means of smoothing 
consumption.  For these households, a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement 
rate reduces the decline in consumption by between 3.5-4.9% using food consumption 
and 1.5-2.1% using imputed total consumption.   
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                                                                                    1 
 
1  Introduction  
Unemployment insurance (UI) has been one of the most studied safety-net 
programs in the United States.  The program is of interest to researchers because the large 
amount of money spent on the program and because the program is often thought to 
increase unemployment duration as it lowers recipients cost of being unemployed.  For 
example Moffitt (1985), Solon (1985), Meyer (1990), and others have found that a 10% 
increase in benefit levels increases spell duration by an average of between 3-8%.   
There are several potential explanations for this explored in the literature 
including that UI could be reducing search intensity, increasing reservation wages leading 
some individuals to not accept job offers, or it could be providing individuals more time 
to seek higher quality employment matches.  My first essay focuses on how UI 
generosity affects search intensity.  This has been an area of growing interest in recent 
years due to the high levels of unemployment following the Great Recession and has led 
to several papers examining how UI generosity affects time use with much of the 
research using the American Time Use Survey (see Krueger and Mueller (2010), 
DeLoach and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama, Patterson, Sahin (2013), Guler and Taskin 
(2013)).   
 However, one limitation with the American Time Use Survey is that no questions 
are asked regarding UI eligibility or benefit amounts.  This has led several authors to 
impute eligibility based off of the cause of unemployment and use the state maximum 
weekly benefit amount (WBA) as a proxy for UI generosity while assuming that 
individuals are eligible for the maximum number of potential weeks of UI benefits in 
their state (see Krueger and Mueller (2010), DeLoach and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama, 
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Patterson, Sahin (2014), Guler and Taskin (2013)). 
While this imputation procedure has been helpful in the literature for examining 
the effects of UI generosity on search intensity, there are three primary concerns with the 
approach.  First, without observing base period earnings, it is not possible to know if an 
individual was ever monetarily eligible for UI.  Second, since base period earnings are 
unobserved, the approach is unable to estimate the actual benefit amount and instead 
relies on variations in the state maximum WBA.  Given that only around 33% of UI 
recipients receive the maximum WBA, the procedure could largely overstate UI 
generosity for a large fraction of the sample.  Third, in many states it is possible to 
qualify for significantly less than 26 weeks of benefits and thus the imputation procedure 
might incorrectly assign 26 weeks to individuals that are eligible for fewer weeks, which 
has led to some individuals that have surpassed their potential weeks of benefits being 
considered eligible.1   
To address these concerns, this essay expands the current literature through fully 
simulating monetary eligibility and entitlement to UI at the individual level.  To simulate 
monetary eligibility and entitlement, work histories of unemployed respondents were 
obtained through fully matching American Time Use Survey respondents to all of their 
observations in the Current Population Survey, the population from which they are 
drawn.  The results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with large 
reductions in time spent searching for a job during normal economic conditions with 
elasticity estimates ranging from -2.2 to -6.4.  However, the results are more mitigated 
during the Great Recession and post-recession period with higher replacement rates being 
                                                          
1 This is especially important for the years 2008-2013 as individuals who qualified for less than 26 weeks 
of state benefits had their potential weeks of emergency benefits scaled down proportionally.  
A  
3 
 
associated with small and statistically insignificant effects on time spent searching for a 
job, although these results appear to be partially driven by the years 2009 and 2010 which 
were at the height of the labor market decline.  The results also suggest that variations 
in potential weeks of benefits remaining do not appear to affect search times, although for 
the 2003-2007 period measurement error could be driving this result. 
The second essay explores the growing heterogeneity in the populations that 
receive UI.  Over the last decade, several states have modernized their UI systems to 
expand coverage to many groups that have historically been excluded from receiving UI 
including expanding benefits to individuals with limited earnings histories, unemployed 
part-time workers, voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons, and increased benefit 
amounts for individuals with children.  The policies were core components of UI 
modernization incentive payments made as part of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009.  After the modernizations, 39 states offered more favorable 
earnings tests to individuals with limited earnings histories, 28 states offered benefits to 
part-time workers, 24 states offered benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling 
reasons, while 14 states have expanded benefit amounts for individuals with children. 
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation from 1996-2012, I 
examine how these policies affect recipiency and unemployment duration.  The results 
suggest that more favorable earnings tests, paying benefits to unemployed part-time 
workers, and paying increased benefit amounts for individuals with children lead to large 
increases in recipiency.  Moreover, I find that part-time unemployed workers and 
voluntary job leavers have spell durations that are around 6 weeks less than traditional 
claimants, while individuals with limited earnings histories and individuals that received 
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additional payments for having children had similar spell durations to traditional 
claimants. 
The third essay examines whether UI helps recipients to smooth consumption, 
which has been a question of growing interest in recent years.  It has been well 
documented that income declines during unemployment are on average significantly 
larger than declines in consumption, which speaks to the fact that many individuals have 
other means of smoothing consumption.  Given this, there is much interest in the degree 
that UI smooths consumption which is an important question for three main reasons.  
First, governments spend large amounts of money on UI.  To this point, total cumulative 
government spending on UI in the United States exceeded half a trillion dollars from 
2007-2012.  Second, UI is often touted to produce a Keynesian stimulus effect where 
most people who receive UI spend the dollars that they receive quickly which helps to 
increase aggregate demand and ultimately employment.  Such an effect only happens if 
UI affects consumption.  Third, the degree that UI smooths consumption is one of the 
three key parameters need to identify optimal UI benefits (see Bailey (1978) and Chetty 
(2006) who generalizes Bailey’s work).   
 There has been a small literature that examines the consumption smoothing 
benefits of UI in the United States.  Gruber (1997) uses food consumption data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968-1987 to find that a 10 percentage-point 
increase in the replacement rate reduces the drop in consumption by 2.8%.  Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2015) expand Gruber’s model and find that Gruber’s finding does not vary 
throughout the business cycle.  East and Kuka (2015) extend Gruber's analysis to the 
1968-2011 period. They find that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI largely 
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declined in the 1990s and that UI no longer smoothes consumption.  However, two 
challenges with this literature have been that little is known about how UI smooths 
aggregate consumption (rather than simply food consumption) or how liquidity affects 
the consumption smoothing benefits of UI. 
To address these concerns, I use food consumption and a more comprehensive 
measure of consumption based on Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) and impute wealth 
following Zeldes (1989) using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics from 1968-2012 to 
show that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI for prime-age recipients have 
remained fairly constant over time.  My primary findings are twofold.  First, the 
consumption smoothing benefits of UI that past studies have found are primarily 
concentrated on the 27% of households that do not have other means of smoothing 
consumption.  For these households, a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement 
rate reduces the decline in consumption by between 3.5-4.9% using food consumption 
and 1.5-2.1% using imputed total consumption.  Second, I find that the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI have remained fairly constant over time using both food 
consumption and imputed total consumption and that more generous UI benefits help to 
smooth consumption for households that do not have other means of smoothing 
consumption.   
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2  Reassessing the Effects of Unemployment Insurance Generosity on Search 
Intensity: New Evidence from Earnings Histories   
 
2.1  Introduction  
Since the onset of the Great Recession, there has been a renewed debate among 
policymakers about how UI generosity affects unemployed individuals’ reemployment 
probabilities.  Much of the debate has focused on whether more generous UI benefits 
reduce how much effort recipients put into job search.  This has led to a growing interest 
among researchers about how UI generosity affects time use with much of the research 
using the American Time Use Survey (see Krueger and Mueller (2010), DeLoach and 
Kurt (2013), Mukoyama, Patterson, Sahin (2013), Guler and Taskin (2013)).  However, 
one limitation with the American Time Use Survey is that no information is asked in the 
survey regarding unemployment insurance eligibility or receipt.  This has led several 
authors to impute UI eligibility based off of the cause of unemployment and use the state 
maximum weekly benefit amount as a proxy for UI generosity while also assuming that 
individuals are eligible for the maximum number of potential weeks of UI benefits in 
their state.  However the concern with this imputation procedure is that individuals might 
not have sufficient past earnings to qualify for UI and only around 35% of eligible 
individuals qualify for the state maximum weekly benefit amount and hence it might not 
be an appropriate proxy for an individual’s actual benefit amount (see Krueger and 
Meyer (2002)).  Furthermore, in several states it is possible to qualify for significantly 
less than the maximum number of potential weeks of benefits.  To address these 
concerns, I obtain earnings histories of ATUS respondents and use this information to 
simulate UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits.   
A  
7 
 
 To obtain earnings histories, this essay takes advantage of the fact that the 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is drawn from the eighth and final wave of the 
Current Population Survey (CPS).  The CPS provides valuable information about ATUS 
respondents’ past earnings during their base period, the period where UI eligibility, 
benefit levels, and potential weeks of benefits are determined.  To obtain ATUS 
respondents' past earnings, I longitudinally match each respondent's CPS observations 
across all eight waves of the survey.  I then determine the number of CPS observations 
that fall within each respondent's base period.  Respondents can have up to four CPS 
observations in their base period and I exclude respondents with less than four 
observations from the analysis.  I then use respondents' hours worked during each wave 
of their base period and their hourly wage to determine base period earnings.   
Base period earnings are then run through a simulation program.  The simulation 
biannually captures the structure of each state UI system to determine monetary 
eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits for each respondent 
for the period preceding and following the Great Recession from 2003-2013.  The 
simulation is the first to fully simulate eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential 
weeks of benefits for all extended and emergency benefits stemming from the Great 
Recession.  The simulation suggest that approximately 17% of individuals included in 
past studies were ineligible for UI while over two-thirds of eligible respondents received 
benefits less than the maximum weekly benefit amount.  I then exclude the 17% of 
ineligible respondents included in past studies and focus the analysis on variations in 
each respondent's individual replacement rate which was not possible in past studies as 
both the weekly benefit amount and base period earnings were unobserved.  
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The results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with large 
reductions in time spent searching for a job during normal economic conditions with 
elasticities ranging from -2.2 to -6.4, which are larger in magnitude than past studies have 
found which relied on state variation in UI generosity.  However, the results are more 
mitigated during the Great Recession and post-recession period with higher replacement 
rates being associated with small and statistically insignificant effects on search times, 
with elasticity estimates ranging from -.6 to 0, although the years 2009 and 2010 which 
were at the height of the labor market decline appear to be partially driving these results.  
Overall, the results suggest that the moral hazard that more generous replacement rates 
can induce might be more mitigated during adverse economic conditions.  However, the 
results suggest that variations in potential weeks of benefits remaining do not appear to affect 
search times, although for the 2003-2007 period measurement error could be driving this result.  
The findings suggest that optimal replacement rates might vary throughout the business 
cycle.   
 
2.2  Literature Review 
Since its inception in the United States in the late 1930s, there has always been a 
great deal of concern that UI produces a “moral hazard” effect where leisure is subsidized 
through unemployment insurance and this “moral hazard” effect is often assumed to be 
increasing in UI generosity.  As predicted by UI search models such as Mortensen (1977) 
and Moffitt and Nicholson (1982), UI lowers search intensity and raises reservation 
wages of recipients in both the replacement rate and duration of potential benefits.  There 
is also a large empirical literature that examines the effects of increased benefit amounts 
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on spell duration.  For example Moffitt (1985), Solon (1985), Meyer (1990), and others 
have found that a 10% increase in benefit levels increases spell duration by an average of 
between 3-8%.  There has also been a large literature that examines how increases in 
potential weeks of benefits affect spell duration.  For example, Moffitt (1985), Solon 
(1985), Katz and Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), and others have found that a 
one week increase in potential benefits increases spell duration by between .08-.30 
weeks.   
There has also been a renewed interest in how additional potential weeks of 
benefits affect spell duration during the Great Recession as potential weeks of benefits 
reached up to 99 weeks for certain individuals.  Farber and Valletta (2015) and Rothstein 
(2011) find a small but statistical increase in unemployment caused by the large increase 
in potential weeks of benefits, although their findings appear to be coming from 
decreases in the labor force exit rate rather than reductions in the job finding rate.  While 
estimates vary widely, most research suggests that more generous unemployment benefits 
in terms of benefit amounts and potential weeks of benefits increase spell duration 
although the size of this effect might vary throughout the business cycle.  There are 
several potential explanations for this explored in the literature including that UI could be 
reducing search intensity, increasing reservation wages leading some individuals to not 
accept job offers, or it could be providing individuals more time to seek higher quality 
employment matches.2   
                                                          
2 For papers about UI generosity and reservation wages see Feldstein and Poterba (1984), Shimer and 
Werning (2007), and Krueger and Mueller (2016).  For papers about UI generosity and match quality see 
Centeno (2004) and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2011).  
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This essay focuses on the effects of unemployment insurance generosity on the 
search intensity of the unemployed, which has been an area of growing interest in recent 
years.  Historically since the inception of requiring active job search for unemployment 
classification in the United States in 1940, most survey datasets have asked respondents 
about whether they have searched for a job in the last four weeks as this is a necessary 
requirement for being considered unemployed.3  However conditional upon search, most 
datasets provide little information about search intensity in terms of how much effort an 
individual puts into searching for a job.  
 Historically this has led to little being known about the search intensity of 
individuals that report searching through effort level or time spent searching.  However, 
in recent years several papers have attempted to examine the search intensity of the 
unemployed.  Shimer (2004) examines how search intensity varies throughout the 
business cycle.  Using the CPS, Shimer proxies for search intensity of individuals using 
the number of search methods that respondents reported using during the four weeks 
preceding the CPS interview.  Shimer hypothesizes that more methods of search imply a 
higher level of search intensity.  Shimer’s findings suggest that search intensity is 
acyclical.   
Other papers have examined the search intensity of young cohorts using the 
National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 (NLSY79).  Holzer (1988) examines the 
search methods and intensity of unemployed males aged 16-23 using the 1981 panel of 
the NLSY79.  Like most surveys, the NLSY79 asks non-employed respondents the types 
                                                          
3 See Card (2011) for the origins of the unemployment rate.   
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of search methods that they used in the past four weeks while the 1981 panel included a 
job search questionnaire that asked respondents about the amount of time that they had 
spent on each type of job search for the week preceding the survey.  Holzer finds that the 
most productive search methods were contacting friends and relatives and direct 
applications without referral which also had the highest levels of search intensity among 
the youth male cohort that Holzer examined.  Paserman (2008) uses the NLSY79 from 
1985-1996 to estimate the degree of hyperbolic discounting for job search.  To estimate 
the convexity of the cost function of searching, Paserman uses the NLSY 1981 job search 
questionnaire to obtain data on time spent on various methods of search and their 
effectiveness.  Paserman finds a large degree of hyperbolic discounting among low and 
medium wage workers.   
Another recent method of examining search intensity has been to use time use 
data from the ATUS.  Krueger and Mueller (2010) examine the effects of unemployment 
insurance generosity on the search intensity of the unemployed using the ATUS from 
2003-2007.  Since information relating to UI eligibility or receipt is not provided in the 
ATUS or CPS monthly files, Krueger and Mueller impute UI eligibility based on the 
cause of unemployment and spell duration.  They then use the state maximum weekly 
benefit for the given year to proxy as an indicator of UI generosity.  Krueger and 
Mueller’s findings suggest that more generous UI benefits (increases in the state 
maximum weekly benefit) are associated with lower levels of search intensity with 
elasticity estimates between -1.6 to -2.2.  Guler and Taskin (2013) use the ATUS from 
2003-2008 while also imputing UI eligibility and using the state maximum weekly 
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benefit as a proxy for UI generosity to examine how UI affects household production.4  
Their findings suggest that there is a negative relationship between household production 
and UI generosity.  Other papers have used similar UI imputation procedures with time 
use data.  DeLoach and Kurt (2013) use the ATUS from 2003-2011, to examine the 
effects of macroeconomic shocks on search intensity.  DeLoach and Kurt estimate a 
similar model to that of Krueger and Mueller (2010) while including additional controls 
to model for macroeconomic shocks.  While assuming maximum weeks of benefits, they 
model for both extended and emergency unemployment benefits.  For the analysis 
DeLoach and Kurt include the log of the vacancy to unemployment rate from the Job 
Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS), log of housing prices from Case-Shiller, 
and in certain specifications homeownership.  DeLoach and Kurt find that deteriorating 
labor market conditions reduce search intensity, while the effects are mitigated by 
declines in household wealth.   
In addition to not providing information about UI eligibility or receipt another 
limitation with the ATUS is that sample sizes are quite limited, especially for 
unemployed individuals that searched for employment over the ATUS observation period 
which is 24 hours.  To address this, Mukoyama, Patterson, and Sahin (2013) examine 
how job search behavior varies over the business cycle using the ATUS to impute search 
intensity in the CPS.  To do this they first examine how search times vary by type of 
search and number of types of search, which is essentially an empirical test of Shimer 
(2004) that more methods of search implies a higher search intensity.  After finding that 
                                                          
4 Guler and Taskin define household production as activities that are used for the production of goods and 
services at home instead of purchasing such goods and services from a market. 
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more methods of search on average lead to higher levels of search time, Mukoyama et al. 
impute search time spent in the CPS based on the number and type of methods that CPS 
respondents reported undertaking, which takes advantage of the ATUS providing both the 
number of search methods and time spent searching over the 24 hour diary day.  Similar 
to DeLoach and Kurt, Mukoyama et al. assume the maximum weeks of benefits and 
model both extended and emergency unemployment benefits.  Their findings suggest that 
aggregate job search intensity is countercyclical at both the extensive and intensive 
margins.  Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis (2013) use data from the ATUS from 2003-
2010 to examine time use during the Great Recession.  They find that job search replaces 
between 2-6% of foregone hours worked, while home production and leisure absorb 
approximately 30% and 50% of forgone hours worked, respectively. 
As noted above, one limitation with the American Time Use Survey is that no 
information is asked in the survey regarding UI eligibility or receipt.  This has led several 
authors (Krueger and Mueller (2010), DeLoach and Kurt (2013), Mukoyama et al. 
(2013), and Guler and Taskin (2013)) to impute UI eligibility based on the cause of 
unemployment where voluntary job leavers and new and reentrants are ineligible for 
benefits while classifying all other unemployed individuals with spells less than the 
maximum potential weeks of benefits as being eligible.5  The logic behind this approach 
is that voluntary job leavers have often been excluded from receiving UI and that new 
and reentrants often lack sufficient earnings to qualify for UI.  After eligibility has been 
                                                          
5 A growing number of papers have used a similar procedure on CPS data to impute UI eligibility (see 
Valletta and Kuang (2010), Farber and Valletta (2015), and Rothstein (2011)). 
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imputed, the procedure then uses the state maximum weekly benefit amount for the year 
that the spell was observed to proxy as an indicator of UI generosity. 
While this imputation procedure has been helpful in the literature for examining 
the effects of UI receipt on search intensity, there are three primary concerns with the 
approach.  First, without observing base period earnings, it is not possible to know if an 
individual was ever monetarily eligible for UI during the course of the unemployment 
spell.  This has led several authors to include monetarily ineligible individuals in their 
samples.  Second, since base period earnings are unobserved, the approach is unable to 
estimate the actual benefit amount that an individual would receive and instead relies on 
variations in the state maximum weekly benefit amount.  Given that only around 35% of 
UI recipients receive the maximum weekly benefit amount, the procedure could grossly 
overstate UI generosity for a large fraction of the sample.  This can be seen in Table 2.1 
for 2013 as actual UI payments can vary significantly from the state maximum weekly 
benefit amount.  For example as displayed in Table 2.1, benefits can range from 33-674 
dollars in Massachusetts, meaning that someone receiving a 33 dollar benefit would get a 
proxy value of 674 dollars (the state maximum weekly benefit amount) while someone 
receiving the same 33 dollar benefit in Mississippi would get a proxy value of 235 
dollars.  Moreover, the percentage of recipients receiving the maximum weekly benefit 
can vary significantly by state.  Third, weeks of benefits are often determined by base 
period earnings, where 26 weeks of state benefits is often the maximum potential weeks 
of benefits in most states.6  However in many states, it is possible to qualify for 
                                                          
6 At the start of 2013, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina had maximum 
potential weeks of benefits between 20-25 weeks while Montana and Massachusetts offered maximums 
between 28-30 weeks. 
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significantly less than 26 weeks of benefits and thus the imputation procedure might 
incorrectly assign 26 weeks to individuals that are eligible for significantly fewer weeks.7  
This could mean that if the duration of an individual’s unemployment spell has surpassed 
the actual weeks of benefits available to the individual but is less than 26 weeks, the 
procedure would misclassify the individual as still being eligible for UI when the 
individual would actually no longer be eligible for UI.8  To address these concerns, I 
obtain work histories of unemployed respondents through fully matching ATUS 
respondents to all of their observations in the CPS, the population from which they are 
drawn.  This allows for full simulation of UI eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and 
potential weeks of benefits.   
 
2.3  Data  
To examine the relationship between UI generosity and search intensity, I use 
data from the ATUS from 2003-2013.  Since the ATUS provides no direct information 
about UI eligibility, I match ATUS respondents to their longitudinal data from the CPS, 
the dataset from which the ATUS is drawn.  I then run earnings histories of unemployed 
respondents through a simulation program that calculates UI eligibility, benefit amounts, 
and potential weeks of benefits available.  In the remainder of this section, I discuss the 
ATUS and CPS as well as the matching procedure and simulations used for the analysis.    
                                                          
7 The exceptions to this being Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, New Hampshire, New 
York, and West Virginia which follow uniform distributions of 26 potential weeks of benefits.  
8 This is especially important for the years 2008-2013, as the EUC Tiers required recipients to qualify for 26 
weeks of state benefits to obtain the maximum number of potential weeks of benefits.  Individuals who 
qualified for less than 26 weeks of state benefits had their potential weeks of EUC benefits scaled down 
proportionally.  
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2.3.1  The American Time Use Survey  
The ATUS is the primary source of how, where, and with whom Americans spend 
their time.  The survey is produced by the Bureau of Labor Statistics and has been 
collecting monthly data since 2003.  The ATUS population is drawn from the 8th (and 
final) wave of the CPS, and interviews are conducted 2-5 months after the final CPS 
observation is taken.  Sample households are selected based on the characteristics of the 
CPS reference person (the person who provided the household information during the 
CPS interviews), and the respondent is then randomly selected from the list of adults (age 
15 or older) from within the household.  Sample sizes for 2003 are 1,700 time diaries per 
month and this number was cut to 1,100 starting in 2004 due to budgetary cuts.  The total 
sample size collected from 2003 through 2013 is 148,345.  To avoid retirement effects, 
attention is focused on individuals age 20-65 that report being unemployed at the time of 
the ATUS interview.  For an individual to be considered unemployed they cannot have a 
job, they must be available for a job, and must have actively sought employment in the 
past four weeks.  In total, there are 5,555 unemployed individuals in the ATUS between 
the ages of 20-65 from 2003-2013 (see Table 2.2).9   
The ATUS records time use data on a multitude of activities.  More precisely, 
respondents report each activity they undertook in the past 24 hours (from 4 a.m. to 4 
a.m., ending on the interview day), how long they spent on that activity, where that 
activity took place, and who was with them while they undertook the activity.  The 
ATUS only records primary activities and excludes secondary activities.  Given this, 
                                                          
9 In the United States, active job search in the past four weeks is necessary for being considered 
unemployed.  Moreover, the reference week for employment status in the ATUS is defined as the 7 days 
prior to the interview, while in the CPS the reference week is the week prior to the interview. 
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respondents cannot report multiple activities occurring simultaneously and must report 
the activity that they were primarily engaged in.  The primary variable of interest for this 
analysis is total time spent searching for a job.  This includes things such as all time spent 
on active and passive job search, time spent interviewing, and all other time related to job 
search.  In 2013, unemployed individuals in the U.S. spent on average 28 minutes per day 
on activities related to finding a job (including travel related to job search).  Search times 
averaged 34 minutes per day on weekdays and 14 minutes per day on weekends.  
However, only 16% of unemployed respondents searched for a job on their diary day 
implying significantly longer search times conditional upon search of approximately 
three hours on weekdays and two and a half hours on weekends.  
While primarily asking time use questions, the survey also updates some 
information that was collected during the eighth wave of the CPS that could have 
changed since that interview.  Of this updated information, the primary variables of 
interest to this analysis are a subset of labor force questions from the CPS.  The ATUS 
provides individuals’ labor force status using five groups: employed, employed not at 
work during the reference week, unemployed, unemployed on layoff, and not in the labor 
force.  More precisely, the ATUS asks all questions used in the CPS to determine if 
individuals are unemployed.  This includes questions relating to if an individual has a job, 
is available for a job, and questions relating to if an individual has searched for a job in 
the last four weeks.  If an individual searched for a job then the types of search methods 
that the individual used are also provided.  The ATUS also provides information on recall 
status for individuals on layoff, whether individuals that are not in the labor force and are 
over the age of 55 want a job, and hours worked for employed individuals.  However, the 
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ATUS excludes several important CPS variables including unemployment duration and 
reason for unemployment.10  Moreover, like the CPS monthly files, no information is 
asked relating to UI receipt or eligibility.   
 
2.3.2  Matching CPS files and Constructing Base Period Earnings 
Since the ATUS provides no information regarding UI eligibility, benefit 
amounts, and potential weeks of benefits, I first obtain ATUS respondents’ labor force 
histories from the respondents’ CPS observations.  The CPS follows a format where 
individuals are in the survey for four months then they are excluded from the survey for 
eight months and then reenter the survey for four additional months for a total of up to 
eight months in the survey over a sixteen month period.  Since the CPS follows houses 
(the physical location) rather than households, respondents can have anywhere from 1-8 
CPS interviews, although all ATUS respondents have an eighth wave CPS observation.  
The CPS provides information on labor force status, hours worked, and wage earnings 
which are taken twice during the fourth and eighth waves of the survey.       
To create earnings histories, I first match individual’s basic monthly CPS files 
using respondents' household id, household number, family number, individual line 
number, initial month and year in sample, and state which combined uniquely identify 
individuals across time.  The matching procedure produces an unbalanced panel of 
                                                          
10 To address these limitations, I model unemployment duration using unemployment duration from the 
CPS plus the time between surveys for individuals that were unemployed during both the eighth wave of 
the CPS and the ATUS.  For individuals that become unemployed between the CPS and ATUS, I model 
duration as the midpoint between the two surveys, where the surveys are typically 2-5 months apart.  
Overall 35% of individuals in the sample are unemployed in both the CPS and ATUS with this occurring for 
26% of the sample for the 2003-2007 period and for 40% of the sample for the 2008-2013 period.  
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respondents’ observations ranging from 1-8 CPS observations.  However as noted by 
Madrian and Lefgren (1999) a significant number of matched individuals in the CPS have 
discrepancies in their data such as changes in sex, race, education, or age that are 
implausible.  To address these discrepancies, an algorithm was used where individuals 
are excluded from the analysis if their sex or race differs across any CPS observations 
that fall within a respondent's base period (the period where UI earnings test are 
conducted) or if discrepancies in age fall outside of a four year range for such 
observations.  ATUS respondents are then matched to the longitudinal CPS files using a 
similar match validation technique.   
After matching the CPS files, respondents’ CPS labor force status, hours worked, 
and wage earnings are used to construct base period earnings, and in turn to determine 
monetary eligibility for UI.  Almost all states have base periods that use past earnings 
consisting of the earliest 4 of the last 5 completed calendar quarters preceding the filing 
of the UI claim to test for monetary eligibility.11  These exclude the last completed 
quarter before the filing of a claim.  Moreover, several states have implemented 
alternative base periods which generally test the last 4 completed quarters if an individual 
does not qualify under a traditional base period.  ATUS respondents can have anywhere 
from 0-4 CPS observations during their base period, depending on the duration of their 
spell and the number of CPS interviews the respondent participated in. To construct base 
period earnings, I limit the analysis to individuals with four CPS observations during 
their base period or individuals that have three observations during their base period and 
                                                          
11 Since the initial claim date is not provided in the ATUS or CPS, I use the spell start date which is often 
the same day (or week) as the initial claim date. 
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have four observations during their alternative base period conditional on their states 
adopting alternative base periods before their spell start date.12   
To determine base period earnings, I first determine each respondent’s hourly 
wage rate.  For earnings, I primarily rely on reported wage earnings which are taken in 
the fourth and eighth months of the CPS (the outgoing rotation groups).  Because 
earnings are only asked during the fourth and eighth waves of the survey, 17% of 
respondents have no reported earnings (or have imputed earnings) in the CPS even 
though many of these individuals held employment during their base periods.  In the case 
that an individual had no reported earnings or the individual’s earnings were imputed, I 
use predicted hourly wage calculated using CPS earnings files from 2004-2005.  To do 
this, I estimate a wage equation used by Krueger and Mueller (2010) which they use to 
predict all of their observations hourly earnings of the form: 
(2.1) log(wist) = α +  Zist β + ds + eist 
where wist is hourly wage, Zist controls for age, age squared, education controls for high 
school degree or less; some college; and college degree, female, and ds  are state fixed 
effects.  The wage equation was estimated using 319,813 workers from CPS Merged 
Outgoing Rotation Groups (MORGs) files from 2004 and 2005.  The sample size of 
319,813 was obtained through excluding students, self-employed, self-incorporated, and 
employed individuals with hourly earnings of less than $1 or more than $200.13  I then 
                                                          
12 Restricting the sample to respondents with four base period observations produces the most accurate 
estimates of UI eligibility, benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits but comes at a cost of slightly 
reducing the sample size.  I also explore estimates using three base period observations although the 
results become noisier when using less than four base period observations.   
13 Following Krueger and Mueller, I adjust wages to account for topcoding. 
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use the wage equation to predict unemployed individuals' hourly wage rate and use this to 
calculate base period earnings for individuals that I do not observe their earnings or have 
imputed earnings values in the CPS.14   
I then examine the hours worked for each employed CPS respondent that I 
observe during their base period and multiply this by the individual's hourly wage.  
Individuals that are unemployed or not in the labor force for a given month during their 
base period (or alternative base period if available) receive a value of zero for the 
month.15  I then scale my earnings measure up to an annualized amount which provides 
base period earnings (see Chetty (2008), Gruber and Cullen (2000), Levine (1993), and 
LaLumia (2013) for examples of papers that use simulation programs for UI with scaled 
up earnings).16  
 
2.3.3  UI Eligibility, Benefit Amounts, and Potential Weeks of Benefits 
To determine if unemployed ATUS respondents have sufficient earnings to 
qualify for UI, I run each unemployed ATUS respondent through a simulation program 
                                                          
14 If an individual has earnings reported in both outgoing rotation groups then I use the earnings from the 
earlier period.   
15 A small number of respondents have industry and occupation codes that indicate that they are teachers 
and professors.  It is possible that these individuals could be receiving wage income during summer 
months even while reporting zero hours of employment.  When these individuals report zero hours 
worked during summer months, I exclude them from the analysis.   
16 Another option would be to use the CPS March Supplement (The ASEC) and merge this to the ATUS. The 
primary advantage of this is that the ASEC provides the weeks worked (and wage income) over the last 
calendar year.  However, there are two primary disadvantages to this approach.  First, less than 25% of 
ATUS respondents have a valid ASEC observation, which is significantly lower than using full monthly files 
which leads to match rates over 50%.  Second, the advantage of knowing weeks worked (and wage 
income) over the last calendar year is somewhat limited by the fact that a calendar year generally does 
not correspond to an individual’s base period unless the individual became unemployed between April-
June using a traditional base period.  Given this any benefits from using the March CPS files instead of the 
full monthly CPS files are likely outweighed by the cost.  
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that determines if the respondent has sufficient base period earnings to qualify for UI for 
the individual's state of residence.  The simulation is created using data from The 
Employment and Training Administration's "Significant Provisions of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws" publications for various years combined with other 
administrative records from state agencies.  If an individual has sufficient earnings to 
qualify for UI then the simulation also calculates the individual's weekly benefit amount 
including any dependent allowances when applicable.17  While reported recipiency and 
benefit amounts are latent in this analysis, there are two main advantages of using 
simulated eligibility and benefits rather than reported benefits.  First, UI take-up is 
endogenous.  As noted by Blank and Card (1991) take-up rates among eligibles are 
typically around 67%.  If take-up is correlated with search intensity then using actual 
benefits received would lead to a biased coefficient estimate on benefits received.  
Second, UI receipt is often unreported and misreported in survey data.  As noted by 
Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009), UI receipt is often unreported with average yearly 
reporting rates of 73.8% in the PSID, 74.7% in the SIPP, and 79.2% in the ASEC (March 
CPS).  Hence simulation based methods can help to address these concerns.  
The simulation then calculates the number of potential weeks of benefits that each 
individual is eligible for, which is typically between 12-26 weeks depending on the 
individuals’ base period earnings and the state where the UI claim is based.  The 
                                                          
 17 Dependent allowances are additional monetary payments made by states to eligible UI recipients who 
have qualifying dependents.  The states that pay dependent allowances at some point during the sample 
period are Alaska, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  Dependent allowances can range 
from a minimum of $5 per week in Pennsylvania (with one qualifying dependent) up to $300 per week in 
Massachusetts (with twelve qualifying dependents; $25 per dependent).  
     
A  
23 
 
simulation also calculates all potential weeks of extended and emergency benefits using 
Trigger Notices for EB and EUC from The Employment and Training Administration.  
This is important as potential weeks of benefits reached as many as 99 weeks during the 
Great Recession and individuals in the data can be eligible for 1-99 potential weeks of 
benefits.18  Aggregate unemployment and aggregate unemployment claims by type of 
claim and year are displayed in Figure 2.1.  
In addition to monetary conditions, all states also have non-monetary conditions 
that can exclude voluntary job leavers, individuals not available for full-time 
employment, individuals fired for cause, and individuals that are eligible for UI but not 
actively seeking employment, among other requirements.  To address non-monetary 
conditions, I also impose restrictions similar to Krueger and Mueller (2010).  To do this, I 
use data from both the ATUS as well as the final wave of the CPS which is provided in 
the ATUS to classify each of the 5,555 unemployed individuals between the ages of 20-
65 into four groups: On Temporary Layoff (N=703), New and Reentrants (N=2,125), 
Voluntary Job Leavers (N=138), and Job Losers (N=2,589).  More specifically 
unemployed individuals are classified as:     
• On Temporary Layoff:  if they are classified as on layoff during the ATUS 
interview.  
• New and Reentrants:  if they were not in the labor force in the CPS and were 
unemployed in the ATUS and those that were unemployed in the CPS and 
                                                          
18 State benefits can range from 1-30 weeks for eligible individuals, while extended benefits can range 
from 0-20 weeks, and emergency unemployment compensation can range from 0-53 weeks (although 
jointly they can only run for a maximum of 99 weeks).      
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indicated they were either a New or Reentrant and were still unemployed in the 
ATUS.   
• Voluntary Job Leavers:  those who were unemployed in the CPS and indicated 
they voluntarily left their job and remain unemployed in the ATUS. 
• Job Losers:  those who were unemployed in the CPS and indicated that they had 
lost their job with no expectation of recall, individuals that were unemployed in 
the CPS whose temporary jobs had ended, and individuals that were employed in 
the CPS and subsequently became unemployed with no expectation of recall.   
 
I then classify New and Reentrants and Voluntary Job Leavers as ineligible for UI as 
many states have historically excluded Voluntary Job Leavers from receiving UI while 
New and Reentrants typically lack sufficient wage earnings during their base period to 
qualify for UI.19  I then classify monetarily eligible Job Losers and those On Temporary 
Layoff with weeks remaining as eligible for UI and assign them their individual 
replacement rate.  I focus my analysis on Job Losers as they are the largest of the groups 
and they are also most likely to satisfy non-monetary conditions needed to qualify for UI 
while excluding individuals On Temporary Layoff as they likely face different incentives 
than Job Losers (see Feldstein (1976), Feldstein (1978), and Topel (1983)).      
                                                          
19 Using my simulations, it is possible to test if New and Reentrants have sufficient wage earnings during 
their base period to qualify for UI.  For New and Reentrants between the ages of 20-65 with durations 
below their states' maximum potential weeks of benefits including extended and emergency benefits, one 
third (33.6%) are monetarily eligible for UI.  However, there is still some concern about whether these 
individuals satisfy non-monetary conditions which are more difficult to address.  Furthermore, many 
states offer benefits to voluntary job leavers if they view the reason for the voluntary exit as a compelling 
family reason, although this cannot be observed in the data.      
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2.3.4  Sample Characteristics 
Sample characteristics are displayed in Table 2.2.  There are 5,555 unemployed 
individuals in the ATUS between the ages of 20-65 from 2003-2013 with 2,589 of these 
individuals being classified as Job Losers.  Of the Job Losers, 2,017 had unemployment 
durations below their states' maximum potential weeks of benefits including all extended 
and emergency benefits.20   Of these, 1,060 have four observed observations during their 
base period.  For Job Losers with four observations in their base period and satisfying the 
match quality algorithm, there are 1,013 such individuals implying that the procedure is 
able to match half (50.22%) of the Job Losers that are potentially eligible for UI in the 
ATUS between the ages of 20-65.   
Each of the 1,013 potentially eligible Job Losers with four valid base period 
observations satisfying the match quality algorithm were then run through a UI 
simulation program that biennially captures the structure of each state UI system to 
determine monetary eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential weeks of benefits 
for each respondent.  Of these, 144 (14.2%) have observed base period earnings that are 
insufficient to be monetarily eligible for UI while 28 (2.8%) were eligible for less than 
the maximum weeks of benefits and had exceeded their maximum  potential weeks of 
benefits implying that 17% of observed Job Losers are ineligible from receiving UI.  
After excluding the 17% of Job Losers that are ineligible for UI, the sample is composed 
of 841 monetarily eligible respondents that have not surpassed their maximum potential 
weeks of benefits.  I then exclude 18 individuals from the analysis that have replacement 
rates above 100% or that make the minimum weekly benefit amount as this can lead to 
                                                          
20 I also exclude a small number of individuals that worked part-time during their base period and live in 
states that don't pay benefits to individuals seeking part-time employment. 
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extremely large replacement rates in many states.21  This leaves a sample of 823 
individuals from 2003-2013 that are still eligible for UI with unemployment durations 
ranging from 5-61 weeks.22  For these individuals, the average replacement rate is 
48.12%.23  Moreover 32.20% of these individuals make the maximum weekly benefit in 
their state which is consistent with Krueger and Meyer (2002) estimate of approximately 
35%.  
Table 2.3 displays weighted means of each variable included in the model 
stratified by year as well as a comparison to the weighted means of all Job Losers aged 
20-65 that have unemployment durations less than their states' maximum potential weeks 
of benefits.  For 2003-2013 mean job search was 60 minutes per day compared to 56 
minutes for all Job Losers with the difference being slightly more pronounced for the 
2003-2007 period.  The average age of the sample is 41 years compared to 39 years for 
all Job Losers.  The sample is slightly more educated than Job Losers with 25% of the 
sample having a college degree compared to 21% of Job Losers.  Females makeup 42% 
of the sample compared to 43% of Job Losers.  Moreover, the sample is slightly more 
likely to have a partner than Job Losers with 59% of the sample having a partner relative 
to 53% of Job Losers.  The largest difference between the sample and Job Losers is 
homeownership with 71% of individuals in the sample being homeowners relative to 
                                                          
21 Since the state minimum weekly benefit amount is often legislated by law, it is possible to qualify for UI 
in many states with earnings less than what is needed to qualify for the minimum weekly benefit amount 
using a state's UI benefit formula which can lead to large replacement rates.    
22 Since individuals can be in the CPS for a period spanning 16 months and the ATUS interview is typically  
conducted 2-5 months after the final CPS observation, the longest spell that I am able to observe is 61 
weeks with the average spell length being 12.9 weeks given that UI base periods typically span a year. 
23 When applicable, the replacement rate includes a $25 benefit increase in UI benefits from the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act that was available from February 2009 until December 2010 for claims 
filed before May 27, 2010.   
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58% of Job Losers.24  With the exception of homeownership, the means in Table 2.3 
suggest that the sample and Job Losers are similar in regards to the variables used in the 
analysis.    
 
2.4  Model  
For the 823 ATUS respondents meeting this criterion from 2003-2013, I model 
search intensity following Krueger and Mueller (2010) while replacing log of maximum 
weekly benefit with each respondents' UI replacement rate.  My model is then of the 
form:  
(2.2) Searchist = α + β1 Replacement Rateist + β2 log(𝑤𝑤� Rist) + β3 dps + Xist π1 +  dt  + uist 
where Searchist  is total minutes of the diary day that were devoted to job search, 
Replacement Rateist is the ratio of each individual’s weekly benefit amount to the 
individual’s average weekly wage during the individual’s base period, 𝑤𝑤� Ris is the predicted 
hourly wage of worker i in state s, dps  is a dispersion parameter created from the wage 
equation in Section 2.3, Xist controls for age, age squared, education controls for high 
school degree or less; some college; and college degree, female, partner, children in the 
household, interactions between female and partner and female and children, weekend, 
and dt are month and year fixed effects.25  Standard errors are clustered by state.  
Moreover, all regressions are weighted using official survey weights.  To isolate the 
                                                          
24  This difference is primarily caused by the CPS following houses (the physical location) rather than 
individuals which increases the likelihood that individuals that move frequently will be excluded from the 
analysis.  To address this difference, I include additional controls in certain specifications that control for 
homeownership.    
 
25 I also estimate models that include state fixed effects.  These models don’t meaningfully change my 
main findings and are available upon request. 
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component of UI variation that is only a function of variations in state UI generosity, I 
follow Gruber (1997) and instrument each individual’s replacement rate with a simulated 
replacement rate.  To create the simulated replacement rate, I run each of the 823 UI 
eligible individuals from the 2003-2013 period through the simulation program for each 
state-year cell and calculate the average replacement rate biannually.26 27  To ensure the 
validity of the instrument, F-Statistics for the significance of the instrument excluded 
from the structural model are included after each IV model.  The F-Statistics across all 
specifications range from 12-67 and hence the instrument does not appear to be weak (see 
Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005)).   
To address the large changes in economic conditions and increases in potential 
weeks of UI benefits during the Great Recession, I stratify the sample into the 2003-2007 
period and 2008-2013 period as well as including the entire sample period from 2003-
2013.  I also include additional macroeconomic controls in certain specifications to 
control for variations in economic conditions throughout the period.  These include 
controls for the monthly state unemployment rate at the time of the ATUS observation, 
homeownership, the real value of the Case-Shiller National Home Price Index, the 
interaction between homeownership and the real value of the Case-Shiller National Home 
Price Index, and the real value of the S&P500.  In these specifications, I also include a 
                                                          
26 For similar applications used in the Medicaid literature see Currie and Gruber (1996), Gruber and 
Yelowitz (1999), and Brown, Kowalski, and Lurie (2014).  Moreover, using the state average and maximum 
weekly benefits amounts divided by the state average weekly wage from administrative sources produces 
similar results.       
27 Krueger and Mueller (2010) include corresponding IV models using state level variation in UI generosity 
where they instrument for the state average weekly benefit amount using the state maximum weekly 
benefit amount in certain specifications.  
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control for expected potential weeks of benefits remaining to account for the large 
number of potential weeks of benefits that were available during the 2008-2013 period.    
 
2.5.1  Results  
The results for how UI generosity affects search intensity are displayed in Table 
2.4.  The results suggest that for the entire sample period from 2003-2013, higher 
replacement rates are associated with reductions in search intensity.  The baseline 
estimates suggest that each percentage-point increase in an individual’s replacement rate 
is on average associated with a 1.24 minute per day reduction in search times producing 
an elasticity of -1.0 while the IV estimates suggest a reduction of 1.43 minutes per day 
producing and elasticity of -1.2 with an average search time of 60 minutes per day.  
However, given the large amount of unemployment and lack of employment 
opportunities that arose following the Great Recession, the estimates for this period are 
much larger in magnitude when the years 2009-2010 are excluded from the analysis (See 
Table 2.6, Specification 6).  For the 2003-2013 period (excluding 2009 and 2010), the 
baseline estimates suggest that each percentage-point increase in an individual’s 
replacement rate is on average associated with a 1.56 minute per day reduction in search 
times producing an elasticity of -1.2 while the IV estimates suggest a reduction of 5.60 
minutes per day producing and elasticity of -4.2 with an average search time of 64 
minutes per day.  While the results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated 
with reductions in search intensity, the stratified sample suggests that there are large 
differences in the effect of UI generosity in the pre and post periods of the Great 
Recession.   
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The results suggest that for the 2003-2007 period, higher replacement rates were 
associated with large reductions in search intensity.  The baseline estimates suggest that 
each percentage-point increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average 
associated with a 2.65 minute per day reduction in search times implying an elasticity of -
2.2 while the IV estimates suggest a much larger reduction of 7.04 minutes per day 
implying an elasticity of -5.8 with an average search time of 58 minutes per day.  The 
elasticities are larger in magnitude than Krueger and Mueller (2010) OLS estimate of -1.6 
for all Job Losers for the 2003-2007 period using the maximum weekly benefit.28  
However, since I am estimating this on a subsample of Krueger and Mueller’s sample 
while excluding 16% of respondents that I observe that were never monetarily eligible for 
UI or had exceeded their maximum weeks of benefits, it is possible that sample 
heterogeneity is driving these differences.  To test for sample heterogeneity, I reestimate 
Krueger and Mueller's OLS model for my sample of 285 individuals and obtain an 
elasticity estimate of -1.5 which is slightly smaller in magnitude than Krueger and 
Mueller's estimate for all Job Losers with durations below the state maximum potential 
weeks of benefits of -1.6 implying that sample heterogeneity is not driving these 
differences.  My elasticity estimates between -2.2 and -5.8 suggest that reductions in 
search times caused by increases in UI generosity for this period are much larger than 
previously thought.      
                                                          
28  Since Krueger and Mueller are using the maximum weekly benefit as a proxy for the generosity of the 
weekly benefit amount and since the replacement rate = (weekly benefit amount / the average weekly 
wage in the base period)*100, a 1% increase in UI generosity would increase the weekly benefit amount 
and hence the replacement rate by 1% which allows for the direct comparison between elasticities for the 
maximum weekly benefit amount and the replacement rate.    
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While the results in Table 2.4 suggest that for the 2003-2007 period higher 
replacement rates were associated with large reductions in time spent searching for a job, 
the effects are much smaller for the 2008-2013 period.  The baseline estimates suggest 
that each percentage-point increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average 
associated with a .72 minute reduction per day in search times implying an elasticity of -
.6 while the IV estimates suggest no reduction with a coefficient of zero and an elasticity 
of 0, with both coefficients being statistically insignificant.  The average search time was 
62 minutes per day over this period.  For the 2008-2013 period (excluding 2009 and 2010 
and displayed in Table 2.6), the baseline estimates suggest that each percentage-point 
increase in an individual’s replacement rate is on average associated with a .62 minute 
per day reduction in search times producing an elasticity of -.4 while the IV estimates 
suggest a reduction of 4.33 minutes per day producing and elasticity of -2.8 with an 
average search time of 69 minutes per day.  The results suggest that higher replacement 
rates had little effect on search intensity during the Great Recession and the period 
following the Great Recession, although the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the 
height of the labor market decline appear to be partially driving these results.      
                                                           
       2.5.2  Additional Macro Controls and Potential Weeks of Benefits  
One concern with these estimates is the large variation in economic conditions 
that occurred throughout the 2003-2013 period as well as the large amount of potential 
weeks of benefits available from 2008-2013.  To address these concerns, I estimate the 
equation: 
(2.3) Searchist  = α + β1 Replacement Rateist + β2 log(𝑤𝑤� Rist ) + β3 dps + Xist  π1 + Zst π2 + λ Weeksist  + dt + uist 
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which is similar to Equation 2.2 while also including vector Zst which controls for the 
macroeconomic conditions faced by the individual and Weeksist which controls for 
known potential weeks of benefits remaining.  The vector Zst controls for the seasonally 
adjusted monthly state unemployment rate, homeownership, the log of the real Case-
Shiller National Home Price Index, the interaction between homeownership and the log 
of the real Case-Shiller National Home Price Index, and the log of the real value of the 
S&P500.  The variable Weeksist controls for weeks of benefits remaining that an 
informed individual would have expected if current economic conditions persisted.  
Given the structure of EUC rollout, most individuals in the ATUS would not have known 
how many potential weeks of benefits they would ultimately be eligible for during the 
2008-2013 period.  To address this concern, I construct a variable that captures the 
number of potential weeks of benefits an individual would have expected to have 
remaining if current laws and economic conditions persisted at the time of the ATUS 
interview.29  
The results are displayed in Table 2.5.  The coefficients on replacement rate are 
similar to those in Table 2.4 with elasticity estimates of -2.2 to -6.4 for the 2003-2007 
period and elasticity estimates of around 0 for the 2008-2013 period.  The coefficients on 
potential weeks of benefits remaining are small and statistically insignificant.  For the 
2003-2007 period, this might be due to measurement error through not knowing potential 
weeks of benefits remaining for the 74% of individuals where unemployment duration is 
                                                          
29 I also explore other measures of potential weeks of benefits remaining including total and continuous 
potential weeks of benefits remaining based off of my simulation as well as other measures of potential 
weeks remaining.  Since most of the measures are highly correlated, interchanging these variables 
produces similar results.     
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unobserved and calculated as the midpoint between the 2-5 months between the CPS and 
ATUS.  For these 74% of individuals, the error in weeks remaining can be as much as 4-
11 weeks (depending on the time between the CPS and ATUS) which is large considering 
that the average expected potential weeks remaining for this period is 17 weeks as 
displayed in Table 2.3.  Hence measurement error could be driving this result.  For the 
2008-2013 period, the coefficient on expected potential weeks remaining is essentially 
zero.  Since unemployment duration is observed for 40% of this sample and the 
maximum potential error is much smaller (still 4-11 weeks) relative to average expected 
potential weeks remaining which is 37 weeks, measurement error is a much smaller 
concern for this period.  This suggests that having more potential weeks of benefits 
remaining leads to little variation in search times for the 2008-2013 period.  This is 
consistent with Farber and Valletta (2015) and Rothstein (2011) findings that expansions 
in potential weeks of benefits had small effects on reemployment probabilities and were 
primarily caused by individuals not exiting the labor force.  Overall, the results suggest 
that higher replacement rates are associated with large reductions in search intensity 
during normal economic conditions, while the effects appear to be small and statistically 
insignificant during adverse economic conditions.  Moreover, variations in potential 
weeks of benefits remaining do not appear to be associated with deviations in search 
times although measurement error could be driving this result for the 2003-2007 period.  
 
2.5.3  Additional Specification Checks 
 In this section I use alternate specifications to consider the robustness of the 
results.  The coefficients for the replacement rate are displayed in Table 2.6 and are 
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displayed by year and whether macroeconomic controls and expected potential weeks of 
benefits remaining were included in the models.  The coefficients on expected potential 
weeks of benefits remaining are not included in Table 2.6 but are not statistically 
significant in any of the specifications the variable is included in.      
One potential concern with the 2008-2013 estimates is that selection is driving the 
results.  Given the large decline in the employment population rate over the period and 
the large increase in unemployment, one possibility is that individuals with low levels of 
labor force attachment remained unemployed rather than exiting the labor force to remain 
eligible for the large number of potential weeks of benefits available during this period.  
To address this concern, I reestimate Equation 2.2 and 2.3 on populations who are less 
sensitive to labor force transitions throughout the business cycle.  Specification 1 
reestimates Equation 2.2 and 2.3 for individuals aged 25-55.  Individuals in this age range 
typically have a higher degree of labor force attachment than younger and older cohorts.  
Specification 2 looks at individuals without an employed partner since these individuals' 
change in household income is more sensitive to variations in the replacement rate, while 
Specification 3 looks at individuals aged 25-55 that don't have an employed partner.  
Overall, the results are similar to those including the entire sample of eligible Job Losers 
and suggest that selection is not driving the results.       
 Specification 4 includes each individual’s weekly benefit amount in the baseline 
model.  The inclusion of the individual weekly benefit amount has little effect on the 
replacement rate and its coefficients are small and statistically insignificant in each of the 
models.  The final specification, Specification 5 estimates Equation 2.2 and 2.3 for the 
post 2007 period and the entire sample period while excluding data from 2009 and 2010 
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to ensure that these years which were at the peak of the labor market decline are not 
driving the results.  For the 2008-2013 results (excluding 2009 and 2010), the coefficients 
are negative and larger in magnitude than the estimates including 2009 and 2010 but are 
still statistically insignificant.  For the 2003-2013 period (excluding 2009 and 2010), the 
coefficients are negative and larger in magnitude than the estimates including 2009 and 
2010.  This suggest that increases in UI generosity appear to lead to large reductions in 
search intensity although these results are mitigated by the large number of unemployed 
and lack of job openings for the 2009-2010 period.  In all, the specification checks 
suggest that the baseline results are robust.  
   
2.5.4 Policy Implications  
Overall the results indicate that more generous UI benefit amounts are associated 
with large reductions in search times during normal economic conditions although the 
effects appear to be more mitigated during the Great Recession and post-recession period 
with higher replacement rates having little effect on search times.  This is important as 
search is an important means to finding reemployment.  Krueger & Mueller (2010) find 
that a one hour increase in search times increases the likelihood of reemployment by 1.83 
percentage-points for the sample of 18-24 year olds in the 1981 panel of the NLSY which 
asked unemployed respondents their search times.30  Holzer (1988), using the same 
supplement, finds that more methods of search greatly increases job offer and 
                                                          
30 Krueger and Mueller (2010) also use this supplement to test if length based sampling in the ATUS 
creates a selection problem where people with higher levels of search intensity are more likely to exit 
unemployment and be excluded from the sample relative to those with lower levels of search, which is a 
common problem in survey datasets.  Krueger and Mueller find that length based sampling appears to 
only produce a minor bias on average search times with OLS estimates of 1 minute and IV estimates using 
"rather extreme assumptions" of around 8 minutes between week 13 and 39.   
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reemployment likelihoods.  Given that search appears to be an important means to 
finding reemployment, the large elasticity estimates for the 2003-2007 period of -2.2 to   
-6.4 suggest that higher replacement rates could significantly reduce search intensity 
leading to reduced reemployment probabilities during normal economic conditions.  The 
estimates are larger in magnitude than Krueger and Mueller (2010) elasticity estimates of 
-1.6 to -2.2, suggesting that higher replacement rates might induce a higher degree of 
moral hazard than previously thought during normal economic conditions.  Moreover, 
variations in potential weeks of benefits remaining does not appear to affect search times 
for the 2003-2007 period, although measurement error might be driving this result. 
  However the results are more mitigated for the 2008-2013 period encompassing 
the Great Recession with higher replacement rates and more potential weeks of benefits 
remaining being associated with small and statistically insignificant effects on search 
times.  The finding that potential weeks of benefits remaining has little effect on search 
times is consistent with much of the literature that has studied how the large potential 
weeks of benefits during the Great Recession affected reemployment probabilities  (see 
Farber and Valletta (2015), Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013), and 
Rothstein (2011)).  Similarly, larger replacement rates don't appear to be leading to lower 
levels of search intensity during the Great Recession and selection does not appear to be 
driving these results.   
Overall, the results suggest that the moral hazard that UI produces through higher 
benefit amounts appears to be larger than previously thought during normal economic 
conditions.  However, these effects appear to be more mitigated during the Great 
Recession and post-recession period with higher replacement rates having little effect on 
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search times, although the years 2009 and 2010 which were at the height of the labor 
market decline appear to be partially driving this result.  The findings are complementary 
to much of the recent work studying optimal UI benefits over the business cycle (see 
Kroft and Notowidigdo (2015), Landais, Michaillat, and Saez (2013), and Schmieder, 
von Wachter, and Bender (2012)).   
 
2.6  Conclusion 
This essay provides the first nationally representative estimates of how 
unemployment insurance generosity in the United States affects the search intensity of 
unemployed individuals using individual level variation in UI generosity.  The essay 
expands the current literature through matching American Time Use Survey respondents 
to all of their observations in the Current Population Survey, the population from which 
they are drawn, and simulating monetary eligibility and entitlement to unemployment 
insurance at the individual level where past studies have been unable to examine 
monetary eligibility and have relied on state variations in the maximum weekly benefit 
amount which can differ significantly from an individual’s actual benefit amount.  The 
simulation is the first to fully simulate eligibility, weekly benefit amounts, and potential 
weeks of benefits for all extended and emergency benefits stemming from the Great 
Recession.   
The results suggest that higher replacement rates are associated with large 
reductions in time spent searching for a job during the 2003-2007 period.  However the 
results are more mitigated for the 2008-2013 period encompassing the Great Recession 
with higher replacement rates being associated with small and statistically insignificant 
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effects on search times.  The results also suggest that variations in potential weeks of 
benefits remaining are not associated with deviations in search times over either period, 
although this could partially be due to measurement error for the 2003-2007 period.  The 
results suggest that the moral hazard that more generous replacement rates can induce 
might be more mitigated during adverse economic conditions, especially at the height of 
the labor market decline during 2009 and 2010.  This finding supports the view that 
optimal unemployment insurance replacement rates could be tied to labor market 
conditions, as more adverse economic conditions appear to reduce the moral hazard that 
more generous replacement rates are thought to bring about.   
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Figure 2.1: Unemployment in the United States
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Table 2.1 - UI Benefits in Dollars and Weeks by State for 2013a
State Min-WBA Max-WBA Average WBA Average Weekly Wage Min-Weeks Max-Weeks
Alabama 45 265 207 794 15 26
Alaska 56 370 250 965 16 26
Arizona 122 240 221 866 12 26
Arkansas 81 451 289 736 9 25
California 40 450 301 1,083 14 26
Colorado 25 466 356 978 13 26
Connecticut 15 591 345 1,230 26 26
Delaware 20 330 245 1,002 24 26
D.C. 50 359 299 1,523 19 26
Florida 32 275 231 822 12 23
Georgia 44 330 267 909 6 20
Hawaii 5 534 424 781 26 26
Idaho 72 357 264 693 10 26
Illinois 51 413 324 1,016 26 26
Indiana 37 390 243 799 8 26
Iowa 59 396 337 780 7 26
Kansas 114 456 341 791 10 26
Kentucky 39 415 292 773 15 26
Louisiana 10 247 207 849 26 26
Maine 65 372 285 718 22 26
Maryland 50 430 329 996 26 26
Massachusetts 33 674 424 1,197 10 30
Michigan 117 362 293 899 14 20
Minnesota 24 393 376 970 11 26
Mississippi 30 235 194 683 13 26
Missouri 35 320 242 824 8 20
Montana 127 446 290 695 8 28
Nebraska 70 362 276 746 12 26
Nevada 16 402 308 822 12 26
New Hampshire 32 427 287 941 26 26
New Jersey 87 624 398 1,141 1 26
New Mexico 76 407 303 750 16 26
New York 64 405 308 1,276 26 26
North Carolina 46 535 290 833 13 26
North Dakota 43 516 396 947 12 26
Ohio 115 413 318 847 20 26
Oklahoma 16 386 293 809 18 26
Oregon 122 524 316 843 3 26
Pennsylvania 70 573 360 934 18 26
Rhode Island 45 566 351 870 15 26
South Carolina 42 326 248 747 13 20
South Dakota 28 333 276 680 15 26
Tennessee 30 275 235 843 13 26
Texas 62 440 341 999 10 26
Utah 26 479 345 794 10 26
Vermont 69 425 313 780 21 26
Virginia 54 378 295 990 12 26
Washington 143 604 387 1,012 1 26
West Virginia 24 424 275 748 26 26
Wisconsin 54 363 276 803 14 26
Wyoming 33 459 359 859 11 26
a. Minimum and maximum values for benefits and potential weeks of benefits are as of January 1, 2013.
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For individuals age 20-65
Specification 2003-2007 2008-2013 2003-2013
Unemployed 2,171 3,384 5,555
By Unemployment Type:
New or Reentrant 819 1,306 2,125
On Temporary Layoff 344 359 703
Job Leaver 65 73 138
Job Loser 943 1,646 2,589
Job Losers:
& Less than State Maximum Weeksa 677 1,340 2,017
& Four obs. in Base Period 362 698 1,060
& Excluding Bad Matches 347 666 1,013
& Monetarily Eligible 298 571 869
& Have Weeks Remaining 291 550 841 
Percentage of Ineligible Job Losersb 16.14% 17.42% 16.98%
& WBA> Min WBA & RR<100% 285 538 823
Eligible:
Final Sample Size 285 538 823
Average Replacement Rate 46.10% 49.19% 48.12%
Percent Receiving Max WBA 33.33% 31.60% 32.20%
Number qualifying using ABP 13 26 39
Average Spell Duration (weeks) 9.62 14.65 12.90
Max Duration (weeks) 44 61 61
a: including all extended and emergency benefits
a: the difference between Job Losers and Less than State Maximum Weeks
  also includes a small number of individuals that worked part-time during their 
  base period and live in states that don't pay benefits to individuals seeking 
  part-time employment 
b: Have Weeks Remaining / Four obs. in Base Period
Table 2.2:  Determining UI Eligible Individuals and Sample Properties
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Specification Mean JL-Meana Mean JL-Meana Mean JL-Meana
Job Search (minutes per day) 57.99 48.94 61.57 60.14 60.45 56.49
Replacement Rate 47.41 50.14 49.28
log real Predicted Wage 2.92 2.84 2.82 2.76 2.85 2.79
Dispersion Parameter 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
Age 38.93 36.9 41.68 39.6 40.82 38.72
Some College 0.34 0.3 0.31 0.28 0.32 0.29
College Degree 0.22 0.19 0.26 0.21 0.25 0.21
Female 0.37 0.43 0.44 0.43 0.42 0.43
Female*Partner 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.22
Female*Children 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.2
Partner 0.58 0.53 0.6 0.53 0.59 0.53
Children 0.49 0.44 0.42 0.43 0.44 0.43
Weekend 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.28
State Unemployment Rate 5.25 5.28 8.73 8.89 7.64 7.71
Home Owner 0.76 0.59 0.7 0.58 0.71 0.58
log Case-Shiller 5.34 5.36 5.05 5.04 5.14 5.15
Home Owner x Case-Shiller 4.03 3.17 3.52 2.93 3.68 3.01
log Real-S&P500 7.26 7.27 7.13 7.14 7.17 7.18
Potential Weeks of Benefits  16.73 46.63  37.28
N 285 677 538 1340 823 2017
a: Mean of all Job Losers in ATUS aged 20-65 with unemployment durations less than the state maximum potential weeks of benefits
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics for ATUS Respondents Aged 20-65 
2003-20132003-2007 2008-2013
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Specification OLS IVa OLS IVa OLS IVa
Replacement Ratea -2.65** -7.04* -0.72 -0.00 -1.24* -1.43   
(1.19) (3.95) (0.75) (2.20) (0.65) (2.13)   
log Real Predicted Wageb 131.76 193.50 -76.48 -91.41 -25.66 -21.95   
(130.64) (160.46) (84.81) (81.49) (72.10) (78.17)   
Dispersion Parameterb -238.77 -438.13 109.31 183.98 84.66 67.84   
(380.96) (399.72) (204.19) (275.52) (163.51) (230.17)   
Age -7.65 -12.84 14.74** 15.74** 8.37 8.09   
(9.97) (12.69) (6.75) (7.21) (5.28) (6.50)   
Age Squared 0.08 0.12 -0.16* -0.17** -0.09 -0.09   
(0.12) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)   
Some College -10.59 -30.24 38.06** 43.12** 25.80 24.58   
(32.17) (43.93) (18.08) (20.24) (16.85) (21.09)   
College Degree -29.60 -108.68 90.76* 106.39* 61.97 57.91   
(71.26) (115.04) (51.03) (55.05) (43.23) (56.31)   
Female 61.52 79.16* -35.19 -39.84* -14.25 -13.18   
(44.58) (46.11) (27.18) (23.11) (25.33) (22.69)   
Female*Partner -40.67 -16.77 -50.48* -52.11* -42.32** -41.73** 
(29.69) (37.10) (26.33) (26.62) (17.98) (19.45)   
Female*Children -4.44 -9.52 28.75 28.44 17.08 17.15   
(34.31) (34.83) (26.22) (25.68) (22.38) (21.96)   
Partner 6.20 -14.87 11.58 14.21 5.07 4.36   
(21.76) (23.10) (20.76) (21.57) (14.08) (15.46)   
Children 23.06 32.18 -22.43 -23.25 -5.93 -5.70   
(28.58) (29.38) (17.81) (17.23) (16.47) (16.04)   
Weekend -60.90*** -65.90*** -58.44*** -56.89*** -62.94*** -63.32***
(14.30) (13.42) (8.86) (10.97) (7.57) (9.17)   
Constant 110.73 370.73 -35.20 -115.97 3.54 17.17
(218.45) (315.88) (115.92) (243.71) (103.90) (195.65)
Year and Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
N 285 285 538 538 823 823
F-Statistic for Instrumentc 12.06  45.80 60.20
R-squared 0.2410 0.1334 0.2046 0.2009 0.1836 0.1833
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  
a The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program
     biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.  
b Predicted Wage and Dispersion Parameter are generated out of sample using CPS data from 2004-2005.  
c  F-Statistics are for the significance of the instrument excluded from the structural model. 
 Measured in Minutes per day Searching for a Job 
Table 2.4: The Determinants of Job Search for UI Eligible Individuals
2003-2013
For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: 1=1%.   
2003-2007 2008-2013
A 
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Specification OLS IVa OLS IVa OLS IVa
Replacement Ratea -2.69** -7.80** -0.65 -0.19 -1.25* -1.60  
(1.09) (3.87) (0.74) (2.17) (0.63) (2.13)  
log real Predicted Wageb 112.18 180.85 -73.88 -81.39 -17.71 -12.17  
(126.21) (164.41) (88.36) (80.43) (73.33) (73.94)  
Dispersion Parameterb -416.12 -663.52 101.18 148.16 60.47 29.81  
(403.20) (441.19) (211.91) (285.95) (166.65) (237.16)  
Age -7.45 -13.71 14.56** 15.11** 7.66 7.21  
(9.75) (13.32) (7.03) (7.09) (5.71) (6.53)  
Age Squared 0.08 0.14 -0.16* -0.16* -0.08 -0.08  
(0.11) (0.15) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)  
Some College -5.10 -27.57 40.72** 43.51** 26.70 24.80  
(27.86) (42.70) (19.19) (18.68) (17.48) (20.22)  
College Degree -13.82 -104.39 90.69 99.39* 59.20 52.66  
(68.77) (118.29) (55.90) (54.08) (44.67) (52.73)  
Female 39.15 57.09 -35.68 -38.32 -13.33 -11.69  
(41.66) (43.73) (30.20) (25.37) (26.34) (22.89)  
Female*Partner -21.04 8.66 -50.16* -51.22** -40.84** -39.71**
(28.06) (38.33) (25.59) (25.73) (17.25) (19.39)  
Female*Children 2.12 -5.05 28.48 28.30 15.92 16.05  
(32.00) (30.28) (26.44) (25.55) (21.36) (20.85)  
Partner -2.68 -26.22 12.24 13.67 6.70 5.51  
(23.88) (27.36) (21.39) (21.28) (13.83) (15.11)  
Children 26.02 36.96 -20.26 -20.65 -4.31 -3.95  
(27.84) (29.09) (18.06) (17.41) (16.32) (15.88)  
Weekend -58.11*** -63.92*** -56.41*** -55.35*** -61.91*** -62.58**
(14.25) (13.07) (8.96) (10.75) (8.10) (9.46)  
State Unemployment Rate 7.48 10.79 -0.80 -0.77 -1.25 -1.24  
(10.54) (13.40) (3.66) (3.41) (3.59) (3.54)  
Home Owner -596.81 -833.32 132.03 162.42 111.23 104.96  
(812.86) (913.64) (935.22) (881.88) (230.59) (229.68)  
log Case-Shiller -476.11 -459.99 156.18 165.08 -49.75 -50.59  
(560.26) (547.96) (344.82) (324.25) (243.10) (235.35)  
Home Owner x Case-Shiller 104.30 147.48 -27.87 -33.66 -24.72 -23.65  
(151.99) (171.06) (185.70) (175.06) (44.61) (44.18)  
log Real-S&P500 -66.59 -24.81 53.34 60.37 60.37 55.51  
(284.29) (289.89) (67.87) (72.83) (69.89) (76.75)  
Expected Weeks Remaining 0.64 -0.31 -0.02 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03  
(1.09) (1.33) (0.34) (0.32) (0.34) (0.32) 
Constant 3170.05* 3122.40* -1209.92 -1375.61 -142.82 -77.08
(1813.92) (1613.62) (1465.23) (1394.84) (1221.55) (1274.52) 
Year and Month Fixed Effects X X X X X X
N 285 285 538 538 823 823
F-Statistic for Instrumentc  22.66 53.58 67.24
R-squared 0.2701  0.1272 0.2095  0.2080  0.1885  0.1876
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  
a The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program
     biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.  
b Predicted Wage and Dispersion Parameter are generated out of sample using CPS data from 2004-2005.  
c  F-Statistics are for the significance of the instrument excluded from the structural model. 
 Measured in Minutes per day Searching for a Job 
Table 2.5: The Determinants of Job Search for UI Eligible Individuals with Macroeconomic Controls 
2003-2013
For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: 1=1%.   
2003-2007 2008-2013
A 
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Specification OLS IVa OLS IVa OLS IVa
Baseline Model:
(1) Age 25-55 -2.44* -4.53 -0.46 0.53 -1.10* -0.47
(1.25) (3.55) (0.67) (2.06) (0.60) (1.97)
(2) No Employed Partner -2.13 -12.83*** -1.16 -1.44 -1.66** -3.71 
(1.82) (4.24) (0.99) (2.02) (0.80) (2.41) 
(3) Age 25-55 & No Employed Partner  -2.11 -8.23** 0.03 -0.11 -1.16 -1.83
(1.91) (3.21) (0.81) (2.04) (0.72) (2.00)
(4) Including ln(Real WBA) -2.61** -6.53* -0.75 -0.10 -1.28* -1.34
(1.24) (3.46) (0.85) (1.81) (0.73) (1.81)
(5) Excluding 2009-2010 -0.64 -4.08 -1.56** -5.60***
(1.00) (3.00) (0.66) (2.08) 
Baseline Model with Macro Controls:
(1) Age 25-55 -2.49** -4.83 -0.28 0.34 -1.07* -0.63
(1.16) (3.72) (0.65) (2.12) (0.59) (2.01) 
(2) No Employed Partner -2.45 -15.07*** -1.20 -0.36 -1.72** -3.27
(1.76) (4.85) (0.94) (1.89) (0.78) (2.43)
(3) Age 25-55 & No Employed Partner  -2.60 -10.10*** 0.08 0.34 -1.21 -1.32 
(1.85) (3.89) (0.86) (1.81) (0.76) (1.93) 
(4) Including ln(Real WBA) -2.56** -7.30** -0.68 -0.22 -1.31* -1.47
(1.15) (3.33) (0.86) (1.79) (0.72) (1.82)
(5) Excluding 2009-2010 -0.65 -4.26 -1.72*** -5.84***
(0.98) (2.89) (0.61) (1.93)
N 285 285 538 538 823 823
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  
a The instrument for Replacement Rate is created through running the entire 2003-2013 sample though the simulation program
 biannually for each state-year cell and taking the average replacement rate for the entire sample.   
N is for full sample
Table 2.6: Robustness Checks for Coefficient Estimates of Replacement Rate for Various Specifications 
2003-2013
For the Replacement Rate: 1=1%.   
2003-2007 2008-2013
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3  Unemployment Insurance Modernizations and Unemployment     
 Duration 
3.1  Introduction 
There is a large literature in economics that examines how unemployment 
insurance (UI) generosity affects spell duration, with much of this literature finding that a 
10 percent increase in benefit amounts increases spell duration by 3-8%.  To identify the 
effect that UI generosity has on spell duration, most papers focus on a group of 
unemployed workers that are viewed as homogeneous after controlling for demographics 
and examine how variations in UI generosity affect spell duration.  However, one 
concern with this is that the pool of eligible UI recipients has become increasingly 
diverse over the last decade based on the cause of unemployment with individuals with 
limited earnings histories, part-time workers, and voluntary job leavers becoming a larger 
percentage of UI recipients.  The changes have largely been driven by several states 
modernizing their UI systems to expand coverage to many groups that have historically 
been excluded from receiving UI including expanding benefits to individuals with limited 
earnings histories, unemployed part-time workers, voluntary job leavers with compelling 
reasons, and increased benefit amounts for individuals with children.   
These policies were core components of UI modernization incentive payments 
made as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) and have 
been key components of the Obama Administration’s plans to overhaul state UI systems.  
After the modernizations, 39 states offered more favorable earnings tests to individuals 
with limited earnings histories, 28 states offered benefits to part-time workers, 24 states 
offered benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons, while 14 states have 
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expanded benefit amounts for individuals with children.  However, there is little 
empirical evidence about what effects these modernizations have had on recipiency and 
duration. 
I focus this analysis on four types of modernizations.  The first is a modernization 
that affects the windows of where UI earnings test are calculated which are typically 
called base periods.  Traditional base periods use past earnings consisting of the earliest 4 
of the last 5 completed calendar quarters preceding the filing of a UI claim to test for 
monetary eligibility.  These exclude the last completed quarter before the filing of a 
claim.  However in recent years, several states have implemented alternative base periods 
which use the last 4 completed quarters of earnings if an individual does not qualify using 
a traditional base period.  
The second is a nonmonetary condition that often excludes part-time workers 
from receiving UI.  More formally, the condition requires that UI recipients be available 
for and actively seek full-time employment.31  While this condition does not disqualify 
part-time workers who are part-time for economic reasons, it can disqualify individuals 
that are part-time due to caring for children or other family members, part-time 
secondary-wage earners for tax purposes or to gain health insurance coverage, and 
individuals that prefer part-time employment.  Hence, this condition could be difficult for 
the set of part-time workers who are part-time because they have constraints outside of 
the labor force that prevent them from working full-time as well as individuals who 
desire part-time employment.  
31 This should not be confused with underemployed workers who receive UI.  For more about 
underemployed workers who receive UI, see McCall (1996).   
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Third, I examine provisions that exclude voluntary job leavers from receiving UI 
even if they are monetarily eligible.  This is a common textbook exclusion from UI 
eligibility.  However, essentially all states offer monetarily eligible voluntary job leavers 
unemployment benefits if the state considers the reason for leaving the job to be 
compelling, although what is a compelling reason varies significantly across states.  The 
modernization I focus on does not disqualify individuals who voluntarily exited the labor 
force due to providing care for ill family members, were victims of sexual assault or 
domestic violence, or who became unemployed due to moving with a spouse who had 
relocated for employment purposes.  However, these individuals must still pass UI 
earnings test to qualify for benefits.  Fourth, I examine dependent allowances which are 
additional UI payments made to monetarily eligible individuals with children and 
sometimes spouses.          
There are several reasons to believe that UI heterogeneity through the treatment of 
unemployed workers with limited earnings histories, part-time workers, voluntary job 
leavers that left for compelling reasons, and expanding benefit amounts for individuals 
with children could have differential effects on unemployment duration.  First, alternative 
base periods expand coverage to individuals with shorter earnings histories.  These 
individuals could include new and reentrants to the labor force with short employment 
durations before a spell and individuals that have suffered a past unemployment spell but 
regained employment before a subsequent spell, which could lead to increased spell 
duration.  Second, part-time workers who become unemployed could have shorter 
unemployment durations than similar full-time workers, although there is little empirical 
evidence on the sign or magnitude of this difference.  Third, eligible voluntary job leavers 
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could have significantly longer spell durations as the decision to become voluntarily 
unemployed is likely endogenous, where eligibility likely increases this probability.  
Fourth, dependent allowances which range from a minimum of $5 per week in 
Pennsylvania (with 1 qualifying dependent) up to $300 per week in Massachusetts (with 
12 qualifying dependents; $25 per dependent) raise recipients’ replacement rates, which 
could potentially increase the spell length of dependent allowance recipients.  The purpose 
of this essay is to examine how these policies affect UI recipiency and spell duration.       
Using the Survey of Income and Program Participation from 1997-2012, I use a 
multi-period difference in difference estimator to examine how these policies have 
affected UI recipiency and spell duration.  My findings suggest that the UI 
modernizations that were part of ARRA led to large increases in UI recipiency.  These 
were primarily driven by increases in recipiency from alternative base periods, expanding 
benefits to part-time workers, and higher take-up rates due to dependent allowances, 
while expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers led to smaller increases in recipiency.  
Moreover, I find that part-time unemployed workers and voluntary job leavers have spell 
durations that are around 6 weeks less than traditional claimants, while individuals with 
limited earnings histories and individuals that received additional payments for having 
children had similar spell durations to traditional claimants. 
3.2  Literature Review 
Unemployment insurance is the largest safety-net program for working age 
individuals.  The program is operated jointly between the federal and state governments.  
At the height of the labor market decline following the Great Recession in 2010, the 
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program paid out over 12 million weekly claims with total joint expenditures of over 200 
billion dollars during the year.  The program often plays a critical role in helping workers 
smooth consumption during times of unemployment. 
Since its inception in the United States in the late 1930s, there has always been a 
great deal of concern that UI produces a “moral hazard” effect where leisure is subsidized 
through UI and this “moral hazard” effect is often assumed to be increasing in UI 
generosity.  As predicted by UI search models such as Mortensen (1977) and Moffitt and 
Nicholson (1982), UI lowers search intensity and raises reservation wages of recipients in 
both the replacement rate and duration of potential benefits.  There is a large empirical 
literature that examines the effects of increased benefit amounts on spell duration.  For 
example Moffitt (1985), Solon (1985), Meyer (1990), and others have found that a 10% 
increase in benefit levels increases spell duration by an average of between 3-8%.   
There is also a large literature that examines how increases in potential weeks of 
benefits affect spell duration.  For example, Moffitt (1985), Solon (1985), Katz and 
Meyer (1990), Card and Levine (2000), and others have found that a one week increase 
in potential benefits increases spell duration by between .08-.30 weeks.  Moreover, 
several recent papers examine how potential weeks of benefits affected spell duration 
during the Great Recession as potential weeks of benefits reached up to 99 weeks for 
certain individuals.  Farber and Valletta (2015) and Rothstein (2011) find a small but 
statistically significant increase in unemployment caused by the large increase in 
potential weeks of benefits, although their findings appear to be coming from decreases 
in the labor force exit rate rather than reductions in the job finding rate.  While estimates 
vary widely, most research suggests that more generous unemployment benefits in terms 
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of benefit amounts and potential weeks of benefits increase spell duration although the 
size of this effect might vary throughout the business cycle.   
Most of the papers that examine the moral hazard cost of UI focus on a pool of 
individuals that are initially eligible for UI and examine how more generous benefits 
affect these individuals’ spell duration.  However, this essay differs from these papers in 
that it focuses on how states determine who is initially eligible for UI and monetary 
payments to recipients with dependents to determine if this heterogeneity in worker type 
is affecting recipiency and spell duration. 
There is a small literature that examines the effects on UI recipiency and cost of 
providing benefits to unemployed workers with limited earnings histories, part-time 
workers, voluntary job leavers, and paying dependent allowances.  Vroman (1995) using 
administrative data examines six states (Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, 
Vermont, and Washington) which had enacted alternative base periods by the early 
1990s.  He finds that for these states between 6-8 percent of claims would have been 
ineligible under a traditional base period. 
 O'Leary (2011) uses administrative data from Kentucky, a state which has none 
of the policies examined in this essay to simulate how these policies affect UI cost and 
recipiency for each of the policies examined in this essay.  O’Leary finds that 
implementing an alternative base period increases recipiency by 2.8 percentage-points, 
while finding that paying benefits to part-time workers, paying benefits to voluntary job 
leavers with compelling reasons, and paying dependent allowances would increase 
average UI total costs between 1.2%-6.3% per policy.  However, one limitation of using 
administrative data is that individual and Department of Labor prescreening might 
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prevent individuals who are ineligible or likely to be ineligible from applying which is 
unobserved in administrative data.32 
There have also been studies that rely on survey data to examine the effects of 
these policies on recipiency, although most of this research has focused on alternative 
base periods.  Boushey, Stettner, and Wenger (2005) use the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation panels for 1993, 1996, and 2001 to estimate how a nationwide 
implementation of alternative base periods would increase UI recipiency.  They examine 
unemployed workers between the ages of 16 and 65 and find that a nationwide 
implementation of alternative base periods would increase recipiency rates by 
approximately 6 percentage-points.  Shaefer and Gould-Werth (2013) examine the effects 
of alternative base periods on UI recipiency.  Using the March CPS, Shaefer and Gould-
Werth examine the probability of individuals receiving UI after alternative base periods 
were implemented.  They find that alternative base periods increase UI recipiency among 
part-time workers with less than a high school degree by 2.8 percentage-points and have 
smaller effects for more educated workers.  This essay expands the current literature 
through being the first paper to examine how all four of these ARRA policies affect 
recipiency.  I then examine how these policies affect unemployment duration, which has 
not been previously examined in the literature.    
32 O’Leary (2011) notes that 654,838 of the 720,913 Kentucky applicants in his sample from 
2006-2009 were monetarily eligible for UI implying 90.8% of applicants were monetarily eligible.  
However, over the last decade, many states have added calculators online that estimate 
eligibility and benefit amounts, which likely reduce the probability of ineligible individuals from 
applying.   
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3.3  UI Eligibility and Modernizations 
To qualify for UI in each state there are both monetary and non-monetary 
conditions.  Monetary conditions require that recipients have a certain amount of earnings 
during an individual’s base period to qualify for UI.  These earnings are then used to 
determine the benefit level that the individual will receive which is capped at some 
maximum benefit that varies by state.  Moreover, all states have non-monetary conditions 
that can exclude voluntary job leavers, individuals not available for full-time 
employment, individuals fired for cause, and individuals that are eligible for UI but that 
are not actively seeking employment, among other requirements.  In many states base 
period wages also determine weeks of benefits which typically range from 10-26 weeks.  
 However since 1970, many states have implemented automatic trigger programs 
that typically extend potential benefit weeks for an additional 13-20 weeks when 
unemployment in the state crosses a certain threshold.  Moreover during recessionary 
periods in the United States, Congress typically passes bills providing emergency 
unemployment compensation which extends potential weeks of benefits for individuals in 
all states or states that meet certain economic conditions.  Combined state, extended, and 
emergency benefits led some UI recipients to receive unemployment benefits for as many 
as 99 weeks during the Great Recession.  Minimum earnings to qualify for UI, maximum 
weeks of state benefits, and the minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts for 
2012 are displayed in Table 3.1. 
One consideration for states when determining UI generosity is that states 
typically bear the full cost of state benefits.  Extended benefit cost are typically split 
between the state and federal government while emergency benefits are fully financed by 
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the federal government.  However during the Great Recession, extended benefits were 
also fully financed by the federal government.  Given that states fully bear the costs of 
providing state benefits, there is a monetary incentive to restrict benefits to unemployed 
individuals.  This can be seen by the fact that at any given time most unemployed 
individuals generally don't receive unemployment benefits.  As noted by Blank and Card 
(1991), only about 30 percent of unemployed individuals receive unemployment benefits 
at a given time although this percentage has increased in recent years largely due to 
extended and emergency unemployment benefits during the Great Recession.  Moreover, 
Blank and Card estimate take-up rates among eligibles of around 70 percent.   
The overall UI recipiency rate peaked in early 2010 at around 80 percent, but had 
fallen to around 45 percent by the end of 2012 (see Figure 3.1 where recipiency is the 
ratio of total claims to unemployed).  There are four main reasons that most unemployed 
individuals don't receive unemployment benefits.  These reasons are not satisfying 
monetary requirements, not satisfying non-monetary requirements, exceeding the 
maximum weeks of benefits, and not taking up benefits.  However, in recent years, 
several states have modernized their UI programs to increase the likelihood that 
individuals will meet UI programs’ monetary and non-monetary requirements to qualify 
for benefits.  I discuss these modernizations below.   
Since the early 2000s, there have been a large number of states that have 
implemented policies to increase monetary and non-monetary eligibility, with much of 
the changes coming from provisions in ARRA which started offering states incentive 
funds in February of 2009.  While ARRA got much attention for expanding emergency 
unemployment benefits, it also included significant provisions that offered states 
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incentive payments to modify their laws to increase eligibility and generosity of their UI 
programs, or if such laws already existed to show that they were compliant with UI 
modernization standards. 
ARRA offered states a total of up to $7 billion to modernize their UI programs 
through increasing program eligibility and generosity.33  Of this amount, one-third of 
funding was offered to states that offer alternative base periods which allow workers to 
count more recent earnings if they don’t qualify for benefits using a traditional base 
period (or if the state’s base period includes the most recent completed quarter of 
earnings).  Contingent on being eligible for the initial one-third of funding through 
having an alternative base period, states could receive the remaining two-thirds of ARRA 
funding offered to them through having or implementing any two of the following four 
UI modernizations: 
• Remove state laws requiring available for and actively seeking full-time work
requirements because an individual is seeking only part-time work, except where
a majority of the weeks of work in the individual’s base period do not include
part-time work.
• Provide 26 weeks of unemployment compensation to individuals who are
unemployed and have exhausted all rights to regular UI payments, and are
enrolled and making satisfactory progress in an approved training program.
• Provide unemployed individuals $15 or more in additional weekly benefits for
each dependent of an unemployed individual up to at least $50 per week or 50%
of the individual’s weekly benefit amount, whichever is less.
33 The maximum incentive payment allowable to any state was based off of the ratio of that state’s 
taxable wages to the total taxable wages for all states from the preceding calendar year.  Hence, larger 
states were typically offered more money to modernize their UI programs relative to smaller states.  
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• Extend benefits to individuals who voluntarily exited the labor force due to
providing care for ill family members, victims of sexual assault or domestic
violence, or who became unemployed due to moving with a spouse who relocated
for employment purposes.
ARRA led eighteen states to implement alternative base periods and 2 states made 
minor fixes to comply with the law from 2009-2011, which brought the total number 
meeting the UI modernization standards to 39 states which are displayed in Figure 3.2.  
Eight states removed available for and actively seeking full-time work requirements for 
individuals whose base period histories were primarily part-time while six states made 
minor fixes to their laws to meet ARRA's requirements bringing the total number of 
states to offer benefits to part-time workers to 29 states which are displayed in Figure 3.3.  
Fifteen states expanded coverage to voluntary job leavers who exited the labor force due 
to providing care for ill family members, were victims of sexual assault or domestic 
violence, or who became unemployed due to moving with a spouse who has relocated for 
employment purposes, while five states modified their existing laws to comply with 
ARRA.  After the modernizations, 24 states did not disqualify such individuals with 
compelling reasons which are displayed in Figure 3.4.  Tennessee was the only state that 
enacted a dependent allowance while Illinois and Rhode Island altered their laws to 
become compliant with ARRA bringing the total number of states offering dependent 
allowances to 14 states which are displayed in Figure 3.5, although generosity and ARRA 
compliance vary widely.   
In all, 39 states received ARRA funds between 2009 and 2011.  After the 
modernizations, 39 states offered more favorable earnings tests to individuals with 
limited earnings histories, 28 states offered benefits to part-time workers, 24 states 
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offered benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons, while 14 states have 
expanded benefit amounts for individuals with children.  ARRA modernizations 
undertaken by states are displayed in Table 3.2.  
One consideration with this analysis is how to treat states who fixed their laws to 
become ARRA compliant (see Figure 3.2 - Figure 3.5), where a state might have had the 
ARRA policy in place prior to ARRA but the wording of the state’s policy might not 
have been ARRA compliant.  For determining how to treat these states who “fixed” their 
policies, I rely on the Employment and Training Administration’s “Comparison of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws” from 2001-2012 and state sources prior to 2001 which 
is the first year that the handbooks are available.  If the state was classified as meeting the 
ARRA requirement, then I classify the state as having the policy for the analysis.  
3.4  Models 
To analyze how the modernizations affected recipiency and spell duration, I use 
generalized difference in difference models to capture the variation in timing of when 
states adopted the ARRA policies (see Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) and 
Hansen (2007) for a description of the generalized models).  The models contain both 
state and period fixed effects (a fixed effect for each unique month and year 
combination), to isolate the effects of the ARRA policy variables that have variation 
across both state and time.   
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3.4.1  ARRA and Expanding UI Coverage 
To examine how UI heterogeneity affects recipiency, I first examine how each 
modernization increases the likelihood of recipiency.  To examine this, I estimate 
generalized difference in difference logit models of the form:  
(3.1) UIist* = α0 + ARRAst  λ + α2URst +  Xist φ + δt + θs + eist, UIist = 1[UIist* > 0]  
where UIist* is a latent variable whose value is determined by the given equation, UIist is a 
binary variable that takes on the value of 1 if the respondent reported receiving UI.  
ARRAst is a vector for the ARRA policies examined in the essay.  It denotes whether 
state s had expanded UI coverage to individuals with limited earnings histories, part-time 
workers, voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons, or increased benefit amounts for 
individuals with children before the spell start date at time t.  The ARRA variables take 
on a value of 1 if the state had an alternative base period or extended benefits to part-time 
workers by the spell start date, for compelling family reasons a value of 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1 
representing the percentage of the three policies considered compelling family reasons in 
ARRA the state had implemented at the time of the spell, and a value of 1 if the state paid 
dependent allowances at the time of the spell, respectively.  Xist controls for age, age 
squared, education, married, number of children, the interaction between married and 
number of children, and race.  δt and θs are period and state fixed effects, respectively.  
URst is the state unemployment rate for period t.  Standard errors are block-bootstrapped 
at the state level.34  
34 See Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004). 
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3.4.2  ARRA and Spell Duration 
It is likely that the UI modernizations as part of ARRA led to differential effects 
on spell duration based on the type of expanded eligibility.  For example, voluntary job 
leavers’ spell duration might respond differently to UI eligibility relative to individuals 
that did not voluntarily select into unemployment.  To examine how UI heterogeneity 
affects spell duration, I estimate generalized difference in difference models of the form: 
(3.2)  DURist = α0 + ARRAist  λ  + α1 RRist + RRist x ARRAist  ψ +   α2URst + Xist φ + δt + θs + 
eist  
DURist is the spell duration of individual i measured in weeks.35  For the analysis, I 
examine spell duration over the first 52 weeks of unemployment and exclude left 
censored observations from the analysis.  ARRAist is the main explanatory variable.  It 
denotes whether respondent i qualified using an alternative base period, was a part-time 
worker who was eligible for benefits, was a voluntary job leaver with compelling 
reasons, or if the individual received a dependent allowance. 
RRist is individual i’s replacement rate measured as the ratio of the weekly benefit 
amount (including dependent allowances) from the benefit calculator to the observed 
average weekly wage during the respondent’s base period.  RRist x ARRAist is a vector 
for the interaction terms between the replacement rate and the ARRA policy variables.  
Xist controls for the log of the respondent’s average weekly wage during the base period 
in real terms using CPI-U-RS, age, age squared, education, married, number of children, 
35 The fixed effects in these models makes duration models difficult to estimate.  For another example of a 
paper using difference in difference analysis to examine spell duration see Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin 
(1995). 
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the interaction between married and number of children, and race.  δt and θs are period 
and state fixed effects, respectively.  URst is the state unemployment rate for period t.  
Standard errors are block-bootstrapped at the state level.   
3.5  Data 
To analyze how heterogeneity in state insurance programs affects recipiency and 
unemployment duration, I use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP) between 1996 and 2012.  The data is composed of the 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 
panels of the SIPP.  The SIPP is produced by the Census Bureau to provide 
comprehensive information on wealth, participation in transfer programs, and 
employment.  Households participating in the survey are contacted every four months for 
periods lasting between two and four years.  Each panel is split into four groups with 
each group being interviewed in a separate month.  Combined each of these group’s 
observations over a 4-month period creates what is commonly referred to as a wave.  In 
each wave, respondents are asked to provide information about the four months since 
their previous interview.   
Furthermore, respondents are asked to provide their employment status for each 
week of each month.  Among other things, the SIPP provides longitudinal data on weekly 
labor force status, the availability of asset data, large sample sizes of individuals followed 
over multiple years, and data on UI receipt.  The survey also asks respondents their 
reason for unemployment.  This includes a brief description of the reason the individual’s 
job ended for the 1984-1993 SIPP panels.  However, starting in the 1996 panel and 
thereafter the SIPP includes a detailed question about the primary reason that a job 
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ended.36  
Since reported benefit amounts are often quite noisy, I run each respondent’s base 
period earnings through a benefit calculator to determine if the individual is monetarily 
eligible to receive UI.  The benefit calculator is created using data from The Employment 
and Training Administration's "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance 
Laws" for each year from 1997-2012.  If an individual has sufficient earnings to qualify 
for UI then the program also calculates the individual's weekly benefit amount including 
any dependent allowances when applicable.  A further discussion of the benefit calculator 
is provided in the data appendix. 
For estimates of how the ARRA policies affect recipiency, I use a sample of 
18,373 unemployed SIPP respondents between the years 1997-2012.37  The sample is 
composed of unemployed respondents, where base period earnings were observed 
regardless of UI eligibility, and that had spells lasting over a week.  Summary statistics 
using official SIPP weights are reported in the first column of Table 3.3.  Females make 
up 44% of respondents in the sample and 37% of the sample is married.  Most of the 
sample has a high school degree as the highest level of education with 16% of the sample 
reported having less than a high school degree, 68% reported having a high school degree 
and no college degree, and 16% reported having a college degree or higher.  For the 
policy variables, 37% of respondents lived in states where alternative base periods were 
36 More specifically, the question lets individuals report the reason the job ended as layoff, retired, 
childcare problems, family or personal obligations, own illness, own injury, school or training, discharged 
or fired, employer went bankrupt, employer sold business, job was temporary and ended, quit to take 
another job, slack work or business conditions, unsatisfactory work arrangements, or quit for some other 
reason.   
37 Given that a base period spans that first five quarters of a respondent’s observation window and that 
SIPP panels bring in new respondents every 2-4 years, I observe no spells that start in 1996, 2001, 2004, or 
2008.  
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available, 37% lived in states where individuals seeking part-time work were eligible for 
benefits, 57% of the ARRA compelling family reasons were available, and 26% lived in 
states that payed dependent allowances. 
To examine how UI affects unemployment duration, I use the SIPP from the years 
1997-2012 and restrict the sample to individuals that reported receiving UI during a spell 
lasting at least one week who did not have imputed earnings during their base period.  
The sample is composed of 4,500 unemployed respondents meeting these requirements, 
given that around 28% of the previous sample reported receiving UI and around 13% of 
these individuals had imputed earnings during their base period.  Of this sample, 3,777 
were traditional claims that were not directly affected by the ARRA policies covered in 
this essay, 52 individuals qualified using alternative base periods, 39 individuals qualified 
using part-time worker provisions, 26 qualified using compelling family reason 
provisions, and 628 received dependent allowances.38  Summary statistics using official 
SIPP weights are reported in Table 3.3.  Females make up 44% of unemployed 
respondents in the sample and 52% of the sample is married.  Most of the sample has a 
high school degree as the highest level of education with 12% of the sample having less 
than a high school degree, 67% having a high school degree and no college degree, and 
21% having a college degree or higher.   
One potential concern is that “seam effects” where month-to-month changes in 
responses tend to be larger for seam months than for adjacent non-seam months could be 
affecting my results.  Seam effects can occur in the SIPP when individuals are reporting 
their weekly employment status over the past four months which could lead to artificial 
38 These add up to 4,522 as 22 of the unemployed UI recipients who became eligible for UI under the 
ARRA provisions covered in ARRA also qualified for dependent allowances. 
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spikes in hazards at the fourth and eighth months.  To test if seam effects are driving the 
results, I follow Grogger (2004) and Ham and Shore-Sheppard (2005) and re-estimate the 
results dropping months that don’t correspond to the last reference period.  Doing this 
produces similar results to my baseline estimates but with larger standard errors given the 
reduction in sample size. 
3.6.1   Unemployment Modernizations and Recipiency 
The results are displayed in Table 3.4.  The marginal effects of implementing an 
alternative base period, extending benefits to unemployed part-time workers, extending 
benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling family reasons, or paying dependent 
allowances are displayed in Specifications 1-4, respectively.  The results suggest that 
recipiency increases by 3 percentage-points from implementing alternative base periods, 
by 2.2 percentage-points from extending benefits to part-time workers, by 1.3 percentage-
points for extending benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling family reasons, 
and by 5.6 percentage-points from paying dependent allowances.  Given that 28% of the 
sample receives UI, this suggest that recipiency increases by 10.7% through 
implementing alternative base periods, by 7.9% through extending benefits to part-time 
workers, by 4.3% through extending benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling 
family reasons, and by around 20% through paying dependent allowances.  However, one 
potential concern with stratifying the models by type of policy implemented is that 
multiple policies might become effective at the same time (or around the same time) or 
workers might qualify for more than one of the policies.  This could lead to the marginal 
effects on the policy variables overstating the effect of each individual policy. 
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To address this concern, Specification 5 includes estimates controlling for each of 
the four policies simultaneously.  The results suggest that recipiency is increased by 2.3 
percentage-points from implementing alternative base periods, by 1.5 percentage-points 
from extending benefits to part-time workers, by 0.9 percentage-points from adopting all 
three of the ARRA compelling family reasons provisions, and by 3.9 percentage-points 
from paying dependent allowances.  The standard errors are larger when all of the policy 
variables are included in the model which is likely due to multicollinearity, although the 
marginal effect on alternative base period is statistically significant and the marginal 
effect on dependent credit is nearly statistically significant with a p-value of 1.59.   
The marginal effects suggest that alternative base periods, expanding benefits to 
part-time workers, and paying dependent allowances lead to large increases in recipiency 
while expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers appears to have a small effect on 
recipiency.  Given that only 28% of unemployed individuals in the sample reported 
receiving UI, these effects are quite large with the estimates from Specification 5 
suggesting that implementing all four of these policies increases recipiency by around 
22.2%.39  The estimates are around four times the size of Shaefer and Gould-Werth 
(2013) estimates of implementing both an alternative base period and extending benefits 
to unemployed part-time workers effect on increasing recipiency by around 1 percentage-
point combined.  The estimates are in line with O’Leary (2011) estimate for 
implementing an alternative base period and around half of Vroman (1995) estimate.   
39 Given that around 40% of unemployed individuals received UI over this period and as noted by Meyer, 
Mok, and Sullivan (2009), reporting rates in the SIPP for UI receipt were 74.7% for the years 1987-2007, 
this number seems reasonable.   
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Another question of interest to policymakers is the demographic backgrounds of 
who these policies increase eligibility for.  To examine this, I interact my education group 
variables with each of the policy variables.40  The results are displayed in Table 3.5.  The 
results suggest that extending benefits to individuals with limited earnings histories 
through implementing alternative base periods increases recipiency for individuals with a 
high school degree or higher by 2 to 3 percentage-points.  However, this result is 
primarily concentrated on individuals with a high school degree or higher.  Providing 
benefits to unemployed part-time workers increases recipiency by around 2 percentage-
points for high school degree holders with no college degree and by around 3 percentage-
points for college degree holders.  However, expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers 
increases recipiency by around 4 percentage-points for individuals with less than a high 
school degree, although the marginal effects are not statistically significant.  Paying 
dependent allowances increases recipiency by 3 to 4 percentage-points for individuals 
with a college degree, by 2 to 3 percentage-points for those with a high school degree, 
and has no effect on recipiency for individuals with less than a high school degree.   
3.6.2  Unemployment Modernizations and Spell Duration 
The baseline estimates are reported in Table 3.6.  For Specifications 1-4, each of 
the ARRA policy variables are run separately with the 3,777 traditional claimants that 
qualified not using the ARRA policies. The results suggest that qualifying for UI with an 
alternative base period leads to slightly longer unemployment durations, although the 
results are not statistically significant.  Using the average replacement rate of 98% for 
40 Given that the SIPP is a relatively short panel lasting 2-4 years, it is difficult to estimate life-time 
earnings and instead I use education to proxy for this.   
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individuals that qualified for UI using an alternative base period, the results suggest that 
individuals that qualify for UI using an alternative base period have average spell 
durations of around two weeks longer than traditional claimants.  Part-time workers who 
received benefits have average spell durations that are six weeks less than traditional 
claimants, although the results are not statistically significant.  Voluntary job leavers have 
shorter unemployment spells than traditional claimants, with an average spell duration of 
around 6 fewer weeks evaluated at the mean replacement rate for these individuals.  
Moreover, the results suggest that dependent allowances have no effect on spell duration.  
It should be noted that higher replacement rates were not associated with longer 
spell durations in the models.  While this might seem troubling, much of the variation in 
the ARRA policies is coming in the 2009-2012 period, where UI generosity payments 
have been shown to have no effect on spell duration (see Farber and Valletta (2015) and 
Rothstein (2011)).   Hence as economic conditions normalize, it is possible that 
differential effects could occur. 
Another potential concern with these estimates is that wages (which determine 
replacement rates) could be correlated with unemployment duration.  For example, more 
generous replacement rates might be correlated with selection into unemployment and 
potentially longer spells.  To address this concern, I use a two-step method used by 
Chetty (2008) where in the first stage I predict respondents' base period wages.  To do 
this, I use a log wage equation of the form: 
(3.3)     ln(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) =  𝛼𝛼 +   𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝜓𝜓 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 +  𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes controls for age, age squared, education group, gender, industry, 
occupation,  marital status,  𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 the state unemployment rate at time t, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  are year 
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fixed effects, and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the robust error term.  I then recover the predicted wage in levels 
and run it through my benefit calculator.   
The results using the predicted replacement rate are displayed in Table 3.7.  The 
sample sizes are slightly smaller as I was unable to predict wages for 80 of the 
individuals as they had either missing industry or occupation codes.  Qualifying for UI 
using an alternative base period is associated with a 3 week increase in spell duration, 
which is not statistically significant.  Qualifying as a part-time worker is associated with 
a 9 week decrease in spell duration which is offset by .032 weeks for each         
percentage-point increase in the replacement rate.  Evaluated at the mean replacement 
rate for part-time unemployed workers of 62%, the estimates suggest that they would 
have spell durations that are around 7 weeks less than traditional claimants.  For 
voluntary job leavers, the results suggest that they have spell durations around six weeks 
less than traditional claimants evaluated at their mean replacement rate of 60%.  
Moreover, the results suggest that dependent allowances have no effect on spell duration.  
My findings suggest that individuals that qualify for UI that are part-time 
unemployed workers and voluntary job leavers have unemployment spell durations that 
are shorter than traditional claimants.  Individuals that qualify for UI using an alternative 
base period and individuals that receive dependent allowances have similar 
unemployment durations to traditional claimants evaluated at the mean replacement rate.  
3.6.3  Policy Costs 
One particular question of interest to policymakers is the costs associated with 
implementing the ARRA policies.  The cost of the policies are dependent upon the 
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increases in recipiency stemming from the policy, the weekly benefit amount paid to 
these individuals, and their spell duration.  This can lead to significant variations in the 
cost of implementing each of the ARRA policies.   
For alternative base periods, the average benefit amount is $186.6 compared to 
$312.2 for traditional claimants, which is displayed in Table 3.3.  Since dependent 
allowances increase recipiency by around 2.3 percentage-points with 28% of the 
unemployed sample reporting receiving UI, total claims increase by 8.2% through 
implementing alternative base periods.  Since alternative base period recipients have 
similar spell durations to traditional claimants, implementing an alternative base period 
increases total UI expenditure by 4.9% on average.   
For expanding benefits to unemployed part-time workers, their average benefit 
amount is $221.7 compared to $312.2 for traditional claimants.  Since paying benefits to 
unemployed part-time workers increases recipiency by around 1.5 percentage-points with 
28% of the unemployed sample reporting receiving UI, total claims increase by 5.4% 
through paying benefits to unemployed part-time workers.  Since unemployed part-time 
workers have spell durations that are around six weeks less than traditional claimants, 
paying benefits to unemployed part-time workers increases total UI expenditure by 2.9% 
on average.   
For expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons, their 
average benefit amount is $297 compared to $312.2 for traditional claimants.  Since 
paying benefits to voluntary job leavers increases recipiency by around .9 percentage-
points with 28% of the unemployed sample reporting receiving UI, total claims increase 
by 3.2% through paying benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons.  Since 
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voluntary job leavers have spell durations that are around six weeks less than traditional 
claimants, paying benefits to voluntary job leavers increases total UI expenditure by 3.2% 
on average.   
For dependent allowances, I use my benefit calculator to determine the amount of 
the dependent allowance and use this to determine how much these increase benefit 
amounts.  For dependent allowance recipients, the average weekly benefit amount for 
these individuals was $344.5 in 2012 dollars.  Of this amount, $34.8 represents dependent 
allowances, which increases benefits amounts by around 11.2% on average.  Since 
dependent allowances increase recipiency by around 4 percentage-points with 28% of the 
unemployed sample reporting receiving UI, total claims increase by 13.9% with 
dependent allowances.  Since these claims are on average 11.2% more expensive than 
traditional claims and dependent allowances have no effect on spell duration, my 
estimates suggest that dependent allowances increase the cost of UI by around 15.4% on 
average. 
The cost estimates for alternative base periods, paying benefits to unemployed 
part-time workers, and expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers with compelling 
family reasons are in line with O’Leary (2011) estimates of increasing cost by 1.5-5%.  
However, the estimates for the cost of dependent allowances are over twice the size of 
O’Leary (2011) estimate of 6.3% which is driven by the high take-up rate of this group, 
which is not observable in the Kentucky administrative data that O’Leary (2011) uses.  
The high costs associated with paying dependent allowances are likely why they are the 
least prevalent of the policies examined in this essay and why Tennessee was the only 
state to adopt dependent allowances under ARRA. 
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3.7  Conclusion 
This essay examines how expanding UI benefits to individuals with limited 
earnings histories, part-time unemployed workers, voluntary job leavers with compelling 
reasons, and paying dependent allowances affect UI recipiency and spell duration.  Using 
the SIPP from 1997-2012, I examine how these policies affect recipiency and 
unemployment duration.  I find large increases in recipiency from implementing 
alternative base periods, expanding benefits to part-time workers, and higher take-up 
rates due to dependent allowances, while expanding benefits to voluntary job leavers 
leads to smaller increases in recipiency.  Moreover, part-time unemployed workers and 
voluntary job leavers have average unemployment spell durations that are around 6 
weeks less than traditional claimants.  I find no evidence that individuals that qualify for 
UI using an alternative base period or dependent allowance recipients have spell 
durations that vary from traditional claimants.   
Overall, my findings suggest that the UI modernizations that were part of ARRA 
led to large increases in UI recipiency.  These increases have led to a large number of 
individuals to receive UI benefits who would have historically been ineligible from 
receiving benefits.  The results suggest that expanding benefits to individuals with limited 
earnings histories increases program costs by around 5%, expanding benefits to 
unemployed part-time workers and voluntary job leavers with compelling reasons 
increases total cost by around 3% for each policy, and increased benefit amounts for 
individuals with children increases cost by around 15% which is largely driven by higher 
take-up rates due to the dependent allowance payments.  These results should be helpful 
for policymakers considering implementing these policies.  
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Figure 3.1: Unemployment in the United States
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Figure 3.2: Alternative Base Periods 
Figure 3.3: Benefits for Part-Time Workers
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Figure 3.4: Benefits for Voluntary Job Leavers 
with Compelling Reasons
ARRA( ) is number of the three compelling reasons in place before ARRA
Figure 3.5: Dependent Allowances 
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Table 3.1: Wages to Qualify and Benefit Amounts for 2012
States Wages to Qualify Max Weeks   Min. Weekly  Benefit W/ Dep*   Max. Weekly Benefit W/Dep*
Alabama 2314 26 45 265
Alaska 2500 26 56 128 370 442
Arizona 2250 26 119 240
Arkansas 2870 25 81 451
California 1125 26 40 450
Colorado 2500 26 25 466 513
Connecticut 600 26 15 30 573 648
Delaware 720 26 20 330
District of Columbia 1950 26 50 359
Florida 3400 23 32 275
Georgia 1760 20 44 330
Hawaii 130 26 5 523
Idaho 2340 26 72 343
Ill inois 1600 25 51 77 403 549
Indiana 4200 26 37 390
Iowa 1990 26 59 71 396 486
Kansas 3330 26 114 456
Kentucky 2944 26 39 415
Louisiana 1200 26 10 247
Maine 4148 26 65 97 372 558
Maryland 900 26 50 90 430
Massachusetts 3500 30 33 49 653 979
Michigan 4307 20 117 147 362
Minnesota 1250 26 38 385 597
Mississippi 1200 26 30 235
Missouri 2250 20 35 320
Montana 2363 28 127 446
Nebraska 3868 26 70 354
Nevada 600 26 16 396
New Hampshire 2800 26 32 427
New Jersey 2900 26 87 100 611
New Mexico 1799 26 74 111 397 447
New York 2400 26 64 405
North Carolina 4706 26 45 522
North Dakota 2795 26 43 516
Ohio 4400 26 111 400 539
Oklahoma 1500 26 16 368
Oregon 1000 26 122 524
Pennsylvania 1320 26 35 43 573 581
Rhode Island 2960 26 43 93 566 707
South Carolina 4455 20 42 326
South Dakota 1288 26 28 333
Tennessee 1560 26 30 80 275 325
Texas 2257 26 61 426
Utah 3200 26 25 467
Vermont 3085 26 69 425
Virginia 2700 26 60 378
Washington 6147.2** 26 143 604
West Virginia 2200 26 24 424
Wisconsin 1890 26 54 363
Wyoming 3100 26 33 459
Notes:  * maximum benefit with  dependents 
** based on state's  requirement that workers  work 680 hours in their base period  to qualify times the state minimum wage 
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Table 3.2: Policies Enacted
State
ARRA Year 
Enacted
 Has Alternative 
Base Period 
Offers Part-Time 
Workers Benefits
Compelling Family 
Reason*
Dependent Allowance Training
Alabama No No No No No
Alaska 2009/2010 ARRA No ARRA(1) Pre-ARRA No
Arizona No No Pre-ARRA No No
Arkansas 2009 ARRA ARRA ARRA(1) No No
California 2009 ARRA Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA No Pre-ARRA
Colorado 2009 ARRA ARRA (fix) ARRA (2) No No
Connecticut 2009 Pre-ARRA No ARRA(2) Pre-ARRA No
Delaware 2009 ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA(1) No No
District of Columbia 2010 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA(1) No ARRA
Florida No No No No No
Georgia 2009 Pre-ARRA ARRA No No ARRA
Hawaii 2009 Pre-ARRA ARRA (fix) ARRA(0) No No
Idaho 2009 ARRA ARRA No No ARRA
Ill inois 2009 Pre-ARRA No ARRA(1) ARRA (fix) No
Indiana No No Not ARRA compliant No No
Iowa 2009 ARRA ARRA (fix) No Not ARRA compliant ARRA
Kansas 2009 ARRA ARRA (fix) Not ARRA compliant No ARRA
Kentucky No No No No No
Louisiana No Pre-ARRA No No No
Maine 2009 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA (fix) Not ARRA compliant ARRA(fix)
Maryland 2009/2010 ARRA ARRA No Not ARRA compliant ARRA
Massachusetts 2009 Pre-ARRA No Not ARRA compliant Pre-ARRA ARRA(fix)
Michigan Pre-ARRA No No Not ARRA compliant No
Minnesota 2009 ARRA (fix) ARRA (fix) ARRA (fix) No No
Mississippi No No No No No
Missouri No No No No No
Montana 2009 ARRA ARRA Not ARRA compliant No ARRA
Nebraska 2010 ARRA Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA No ARRA
Nevada 2009 ARRA Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA No No
New Hampshire 2009 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA (2) No No
New Jersey 2009 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA(1) Not ARRA compliant ARRA(fix)
New Mexico Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA Not ARRA compliant Pre-ARRA No
New York 2009 Pre-ARRA ARRA (fix) ARRA (fix) No No
North Carolina 2009 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA ARRA(2) No No
North Dakota No No No No No
Ohio Pre-ARRA No No Not ARRA compliant No
Oklahoma 2009 ARRA (fix) ARRA ARRA (fix) No No
Oregon 2009 ARRA No ARRA (fix) No ARRA(fix)
Pennsylvania No Pre-ARRA Not ARRA compliant Not ARRA compliant No
Rhode Island 2010 Pre-ARRA No ARRA(2) ARRA (fix) No
South Carolina 2010 ARRA ARRA ARRA (1) No No
South Dakota 2009/2010 ARRA Pre-ARRA Not ARRA compliant No ARRA
Tennessee 2009 ARRA ARRA No ARRA No
Texas No No Not ARRA compliant No No
Utah 2010 ARRA No No No No
Vermont 2009 Pre-ARRA Pre-ARRA Not ARRA compliant No ARRA
Virginia Pre-ARRA No No No No
Washington 2009/2011 Pre-ARRA No ARRA(2) No Pre-ARRA
West Virginia 2009 ARRA No No No No
Wisconsin 2009 Pre-ARRA No ARRA(2) No ARRA
Wyoming No Pre-ARRA Not ARRA compliant No No
Total NA 39 29 NA NA 15
Sources: ARRA Application forms, US Department of Labor 
 * ARRA(number of policies pre ARRA) compliant; fix are language changes were required
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Means- By Type of Claimb
Unemployed Rec. UI Traditinal 
Claims
Alternative 
BP
Part-Time 
Benefits
Voluntary 
Job Leaver
Rec. Dep. 
Allowance
Real Weekly Benefit Amt. (2012)   314.6 312.2 186.6 221.7 297.0 344.5
(124.7) (135.5) (133.5) (149.6) (102.6) (151.7)
Weeks Unemployed 18.21 25.33 25.41 27.60 18.19 22.17 25.33
(19.81) (19.33) (19.30) (18.91) (18.68) (18.37) (19.47)
Replacement Rate 58.62 58.20 97.71 61.80 60.48 57.81
(30.27) (30.54) (36.21) (40.88) (30.00) (24.42)
Real Weekly Wage (2012) 429.2 658.2 664.9 134.7 517.9 516.3 667.0
(507.4) (597.7) (598.2) (104.9) (790.3) (287.0) (589.8)
Age 34.21 41.08 41.39 40.28 39.91 35.79 39.37
(12.03) (10.50) (10.65) (9.867) (9.757) (9.155) (9.603)
Female 0.440 0.442 0.437 0.314 0.889 0.516 0.459
(0.496) (0.497) (0.496) (0.468) (0.319) (0.510) (0.499)
Married 0.374 0.529 0.512 0.399 0.592 0.523 0.633
(0.484) (0.499) (0.500) (0.494) (0.498) (0.509) (0.482)
Other 0.0662 0.0647 0.0669 0.0594 0.0680 0.0276 0.0521
(0.249) (0.246) (0.250) (0.239) (0.255) (0.167) (0.222)
Black 0.157 0.127 0.127 0.0341 0.0748 0.186 0.134
(0.364) (0.333) (0.333) (0.183) (0.266) (0.397) (0.341)
Number of Children 0.844 0.828 0.727 0.563 1.278 1.173 1.448
(1.153) (1.136) (1.112) (0.860) (1.133) (1.088) (1.095)
Married X Number of Children 0.465 0.600 0.530 0.259 0.743 0.662 1.051
(0.982) (1.053) (1.023) (0.660) (1.002) (0.911) (1.156)
Less than High Schoola 0.158 0.124 0.126 0.151 0.0833 0.0372 0.108
(0.365) (0.329) (0.332) (0.362) (0.280) (0.193) (0.310)
High School Degreea 0.678 0.659 0.653 0.657 0.772 0.859 0.685
(0.467) (0.474) (0.476) (0.480) (0.425) (0.355) (0.465)
State Unemployment Rate 6.417 6.842 6.845 7.865 7.204 6.325 6.740
(2.339) (2.387) (2.399) (2.186) (2.685) (2.131) (2.300)
N 18,373 4,500 3,777 52 39 26 628
Regressions are run with bootstrapped standard errors at the state level.  
b Means are weighted using official SIPP weights.
Table 3.3: Summary Statistics by Unemployment Type 
a Represents highest degree earned.  Reference group is college degree graduates.
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Reported UI Recipiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
State has Alternative Base Period 0.030*** 0.023** 
(0.01) (0.01)   
Part-Time Workers Eligible 0.022** 0.015
(0.01) (0.01)
% of ARRA Compelling Reasons 0.013 0.009
(0.02) (0.02)
State Pays Dependent Allowance 0.056*** 0.039
(0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040*** 0.040***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Age Squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Female -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Married 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.051*** 0.052***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Other -0.033*** -0.032** -0.032** -0.032** -0.033***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Black -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022 -0.022   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Number of Children 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001   
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Married X Number of Children -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Less than High Schoola -0.069*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
High School Degreea -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
State Unemployment Rate 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
State and Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  18,373  18,373  18,373  18,373  18,373
Note: * ** *** indicate marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with bootstrapped standard errors at the state level.  
a Represents highest degree earned.  Reference group is college degree graduates.
Table 3.4: The Effect of UI Modernizations on Recipiency 
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Reported UI Recipiency (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)     
(ABP) 0.029* 0.022
(0.01) (0.01)
ABP X Less than High School -0.027 -0.018
(0.02) (0.02)
ABP X High School Degree -0.009 -0.008
(0.02) (0.02)
Part-Time Workers Eligible (PTW) 0.031* 0.028
(0.02) (0.02)
PTW X Less than High School -0.017 -0.023
(0.03) (0.03)
PTW X High School Degree -0.003 -0.005
(0.02) (0.02)
Voluntary Job Leavers Eligible (VJL) -0.001 -0.007
(0.02) (0.02)
VJL X Less than High School 0.044 0.044
(0.03) (0.03)
VJL X High School Degree 0.015 0.016
(0.02) (0.02)
State Pays Dependent Allowance (DA) 0.042** 0.028
(0.02) (0.02)
DA X Less than High School -0.042 -0.039
(0.03) (0.03)
DA X High School Degree -0.009 -0.008
(0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Age Squared -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
Female -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Married 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.053***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Other -0.034** -0.034** -0.033** -0.034** -0.034** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)   
Black -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019   
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)   
Number of Children 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Married X Number of Children -0.014* -0.014* -0.015* -0.015* -0.015*  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
Less than High Schoola -0.081*** -0.085*** -0.118*** -0.081*** -0.093***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)   
High School Degreea -0.006 -0.009 -0.019 -0.007 -0.012   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)   
State Unemployment Rate 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.007   
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)   
State and Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  18,373  18,373  18,373  18,373  18,373
Note: * ** *** indicate marginal effect is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with bootstrapped standard errors at the state level.  
a Represents highest degree earned.  Reference group is college degree graduates.
Table 3.5: The Effect of UI Modernizations on Recipiency by Education
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Table 3.6: The Effect of UI Modernizations on Unemployment Duration
Unemployment Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Qualified using ABP 4.964 5.808
(5.77) (5.49)
Qualified using ABP X RR -0.027 -0.032
(0.04) (0.04) 
Eligible Part-Time Workers -3.816 -3.665   
(5.06) (5.09)   
Eligible Part-Time Workers X RR -0.040 -0.047   
(0.07) (0.07)   
Eligible Voluntary Job Leavers -11.90*** -10.54** 
(4.21) (4.23)   
Eligible Voluntary Job Leavers X RR 0.111* 0.099   
(0.06) (0.06)   
Received Dependent Allowance -0.384 -0.251   
(1.73) (1.69)   
Received Dependent Allowance X RR 0.007 0.005   
(0.03) (0.03)  
Replacement Rate 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
log Real Weekly Wage 0.492 0.466 0.511 0.451 0.441
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34) (0.32) (0.33)
Age -0.094 -0.032 -0.038 -0.041 -0.043
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
Age Squared 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.142 -0.141 -0.162 0.133 0.185
(0.62) (0.59) (0.61) (0.58) (0.61)
Married -1.855* -1.816* -1.916* -1.689* -1.566
(0.96) (0.97) (0.98) (0.96) (0.94)
Hispanic/Other 1.890 1.748 1.593 2.065 2.418*
(1.26) (1.06) (1.12) (1.30) (1.33)
Black 1.661* 1.707* 1.656* 1.708* 1.695*
(0.94) (0.97) (0.95) (0.87) (0.88)
Number of Children 0.703 0.800 0.707 0.795 1.037*
(0.61) (0.66) (0.63) (0.55) (0.58)
Married X Number of Children -0.190 -0.323 -0.231 -0.170 -0.424
(0.66) (0.74) (0.69) (0.61) (0.64)
Less than High Schoola 2.630* 2.767* 2.783** 2.705** 2.601*
(1.42) (1.39) (1.37) (1.32) (1.33)
High School Degreea 0.751 0.931 0.930 0.741 0.751
(0.72) (0.74) (0.73) (0.66) (0.63)
State Unemployment Rate 0.846* 0.950* 0.933** 0.755* 0.770*
(0.47) (0.48) (0.46) (0.43) (0.43)
State and Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb 3,829 3,816 3,803 4,405 4,500
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with bootstrapped standard errors at the state level.  
For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: 1=1%.   
a Represents highest degree earned.  Reference group is college degree graduates.
b All regressions include 3,777 traditional claimants who qualified for UI without using ARRA policies.
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Table 3.7: The Effect of UI Modernizations on Unemployment Duration using Predicted Replacement Rate
Unemployment Duration (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Predicted Replacement Rate (PRR) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Qualified using ABP 3.655 4.499
(4.73) (4.36)
Qualified using ABP X PRR -0.005* -0.006
(0.00) (0.00) 
Eligible Part-Time Workers -8.852*** -8.948***
(2.41) (2.51)   
Eligible Part-Time Workers X PRR 0.032 0.029   
(0.02) (0.03)   
Eligible Voluntary Job Leavers -8.827* -6.014   
(4.59) (4.45)   
Eligible Voluntary Job Leavers X PRR 0.045 0.026   
(0.06) (0.06)   
Received Dependent Allowance 0.451 0.292   
(1.15) (1.16)   
Received Dependent Allowance X PRR -0.002 0.001   
(0.00) (0.00)   
log Real Weekly Wage 0.341 0.340 0.348 0.145 0.208
(0.40) (0.40) (0.40) (0.39) (0.40)
Age -0.296 -0.241 -0.245 -0.226 -0.239
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.18)
Age Squared 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Female -0.001 -0.024 -0.058 0.163 0.224
(0.62) (0.60) (0.62) (0.59) (0.60)
Married -2.038** -2.091** -2.125** -1.802* -1.701*
(0.97) (0.95) (0.98) (0.96) (0.95)
Hispanic/Other 2.098* 1.927* 1.873* 2.281* 2.494*
(1.22) (1.11) (1.11) (1.30) (1.35)
Black 1.140 1.129 1.090 1.282 1.321
(1.03) (1.04) (1.04) (0.94) (0.97)
Number of Children 0.618 0.631 0.642 0.754 0.922
(0.67) (0.68) (0.68) (0.60) (0.60)
Married X Number of Children -0.039 -0.070 -0.106 -0.071 -0.259
(0.69) (0.73) (0.72) (0.64) (0.65)
Less than High Schoola 2.928* 2.875* 2.979** 2.692* 2.638*
(1.46) (1.44) (1.44) (1.40) (1.36)
High School Degreea 0.884 1.002 0.979 0.758 0.846
(0.77) (0.77) (0.77) (0.71) (0.68)
State Unemployment Rate 0.859* 0.979** 0.937* 0.788* 0.797*
(0.48) (0.48) (0.47) (0.43) (0.42)
State and Period Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nb 3,756  3,744  3,734  4,332  4,420
Note: * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level
Regressions are run with bootstrapped standard errors at the state level.  
For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates:1=1%.   
a Represents highest degree earned.  Reference group is college degree graduates.
b All regressions include 3,708 traditional claimants who qualified for UI without using ARRA policies.
A 
83 
4 Liquidity Constraints and the Consumption Smoothing Benefits of 
Unemployment Insurance 
4.1  Introduction 
Unemployment insurance (UI) has been one of the most studied safety-net 
programs in economics.  As noted by Card (2011), over one thousand articles with 
"unemployment" in their title were published in economics journals between 1980-2005.  
Many of these papers in the microeconomics literature have examined how variations in 
benefit amounts or weeks of benefits affect spell duration (i.e., the potential 
consequences of UI).  However, an important question that has received much less 
attention is whether UI does a good job in helping its recipients smooth consumption, 
which is seemingly the program's goal.  While a few papers have attempted to answer 
this question (Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001), Bloemen and Stancanelli 
(2005), and East and Kuka (2015)), evidence for the United States has remained scarce as 
historically it has been difficult to find high quality data on both consumption and UI 
generosity.    
It has been shown that unemployment leads to large declines in average 
household income (see Kawano and LaLumia (2015) and Stephens (2001)).  However, 
household consumption appears to be significantly more smoothed than income, even 
with respect to highly persistent income shocks.41  The divergence from the decline in 
household income relative to the decline in consumption is largely driven by households' 
ability to smooth consumption through other means such as savings, borrowing, spousal 
41 See Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2014), Saporta-Eksten (2014), and Stephens (2001). 
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income, the progressive nature of the tax code, UI, and other safety-net programs.  Given 
all the ways that households can smooth consumption, there is some question about the 
degree that UI smoothes consumption.   
However, the degree that UI smooths consumption is of interest to researchers 
and policymakers for three main reasons.  First, governments spend large amounts of 
money on unemployment insurance.  To this point, total cumulative government 
spending on UI in the United States exceeded half a trillion dollars from 2007-2012.  
Moreover, moral hazard costs associated with UI would add to these costs.  Second, UI is 
often touted to produce a Keynesian stimulus effect where most people who receive UI 
spend the dollars that they receive quickly which helps to increase aggregate demand and 
ultimately employment.  Such an effect only happens if UI affects consumption.  Third, 
the degree that UI smooths consumption is one of the three key parameters need to 
identify optimal UI benefits (see Bailey (1978) and Chetty (2006) who generalizes 
Bailey’s work), which has been an area of growing interest in recent years. 
Much of the empirical evidence for the United States has come from the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), which has been collecting data on food consumption 
since 1968.  Gruber (1997) was the first paper to use the PSID to examine the 
consumption smoothing benefits of UI.42  Using the PSID from 1968-1987, he examined 
how UI generosity affects changes in consumption for individuals transitioning from 
employment to unemployment.  Gruber uses food consumption as a proxy for total 
consumption, given that more broad measures of consumption are not continuously 
42 For early papers examining the consumption smoothing benefits of UI using the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey see Hamermesh (1982). 
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available for the 1968-1987 period.  Gruber finds that each 10 percentage-point increase 
in the replacement rate (the ratio of the weekly UI benefit amount to the weekly wage 
prior to unemployment) reduces the drop in consumption by 2.8%.  Other papers have 
also extended Gruber's analysis using food consumption and found similar effects for the 
years 1968-1987 but have found more diminished effects for recent years (see Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2015) and East and Kuka (2015))43.   
Liquidity likely plays an important role in determining the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI and has largely been ignored in the U.S. literature due to the 
PSID not collecting measures of wealth prior to 1984 and not continuously collecting 
wealth data every wave until 1999.  Much of the Canadian and European literature 
suggests that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI are limited to those without 
liquid assets at the start of the spell (see Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2005)).  Moreover, spousal labor income likely affects the degree that UI 
smoothes consumption.  Households with a working spouse likely receive a lower degree 
of consumption smoothing benefits from UI than those without a working spouse as these 
households experience smaller percentage declines in household income due to 
unemployment.  However, this has rarely been considered in the U.S. literature.  Given 
this, past estimates of the consumption smoothing benefits of UI for the U.S. might 
overstate the degree that UI smoothes consumption for households with other means of 
43 East and Kuka primarily focus their analysis using food consumption but also consider broader measures 
of consumption as a robustness check when analyzing how the consumption smoothing benefits of UI have 
changed over time. 
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smoothing consumption and understate the degree that UI smoothes consumption for 
households without other means of smoothing consumption.  
To determine if UI smoothes consumption and how this varies by wealth and 
spousal income, I use food consumption data from the PSID for the years 1968-2012.  
Since total consumption might not respond the same way as food consumption to changes 
in UI generosity, I also include specifications using imputed total consumption following 
Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014), which uses more comprehensive measures of 
consumption introduced in the PSID starting in 1999 to estimate total consumption.  To 
generate total consumption, the method uses relative prices and taste shifters (through 
demographic variables) to estimate the portion of consumption that is unobserved prior to 
1999.  This is then aggregated with reported food consumption to generate a measure of 
total consumption.  I then impute wealth using a method similar to Zeldes (1989) where I 
use questions on interest, dividend, and rent income to impute wealth for years that 
wealth data is not reported in the PSID. 
Overall, my findings are twofold.  First, the consumption smoothing benefits of 
UI that past studies have found are primarily concentrated on the 27% of households with 
zero-liquid assets at the spell start date that do not have an employed spouse.  Second, I 
find that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI have remained fairly constant over 
time using both food consumption and imputed total consumption and that more generous 
UI benefits help to smooth consumption for households that do not have other means of 
smoothing consumption. 
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4.2  Unemployment Insurance and Consumption 
One of the fundamental questions in the Unemployment Insurance (UI) literature 
is the degree to which UI smoothes consumption.  As noted by Kawano and LaLumia 
(2015) using tax return data from 1999-2009, annual wage income during unemployment 
spells declines on average by 30% of pre-unemployment individual earnings and 16% of 
pre-unemployment household level earnings.  However, as noted by Krueger and Meyer 
(2002), UI typically only replaces around 50% of pre-tax earnings prior to 
unemployment, although households often have additional means of smoothing 
consumption.  These could include savings, access to credit markets, spousal labor 
supply, access to other transfer programs, and tax savings from lost income that could 
additionally help households to smooth consumption during an unemployment spell.  
Given this, households generally need less than full unemployment insurance coverage to 
fully smooth consumption.  
While household income tends to decline by around 15% during an 
unemployment spell, consumption tends to decline significantly less.  Stephens (2001) 
using the PSID finds that wage earnings of displaced household heads fall on average by 
25% from the prior year, household income falls by 13%, while food consumption falls 
by only 5%.  Saporta-Eksten (2014), using more recent PSID data, finds that total 
household consumption falls by around 8% following a transition into unemployment.  
The divergence from the decline in individual and household wages relative to the 
decline in consumption is largely driven by households' ability to smooth consumption 
through other means. 
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One of the most fundamental ways that households could smooth consumption 
during an unemployment spell is through having access to UI.  UI is a joint program 
between the federal and state governments that came about in response to the high levels 
of unemployment seen during the Great Depression.  UI was first introduced in 
Wisconsin in 1932 and expanded to the national level through the Social Security Act of 
1935.  To qualify for UI, there are both monetary and non-monetary requirements for 
eligibility that vary by the state where the wages were earned and the year.  Monetary 
conditions require that recipients have a certain amount of earnings during an individual’s 
base period to qualify for UI, which is composed of the first four of the last five calendar 
quarters before the filing of a claim.  Base period earnings are then used to determine the 
benefit level that individuals receive which is capped at some maximum benefit that 
varies by state.  Moreover, all states have non-monetary conditions that can exclude 
voluntary job leavers, individuals not available for full-time employment, individuals 
fired for cause, and individuals that are eligible for UI but not actively seeking 
employment, among other requirements. 
UI generosity and eligibility can vary significantly by state.  Weekly benefit 
amounts are primarily determined by the state where the individual worked, base period 
earnings, the distribution of earnings, and family structure.  To outline this variation, 
average and maximum benefit amounts are displayed in Table 4.1 for 2013. The 
maximum weekly benefit amount ranges from $235 per week in Mississippi up to $1,011 
in Massachusetts ($674 max for singles).  The average weekly benefit amount in the U.S. 
for 2013 was $296.20.  During normal economic conditions most individuals qualify for 
26 weeks of potential benefits although it is possible to qualify for more or less than 26 
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weeks.44  However, during adverse economic conditions, it is often possible to qualify for 
significantly more than 26 weeks of benefits through extended and emergency benefit 
payments.  This led some individuals to be eligible for as many as 99 weeks of potential 
benefits during the Great Recession (see Farber and Valletta (2015) and Rothstein 
(2011)).   
Another way that households can smooth consumption during an unemployment 
spell is through savings.  Cash on hand, retirement accounts, and other types of liquid 
assets can be used to smooth consumption.  However, as noted by Chetty (2008) nearly 
half of all job losers report having zero-liquid wealth at the start of a spell implying that 
liquid assets might not be able to smooth consumption for most individuals.  Others have 
stressed the importance of home equity as a means of smoothing consumption (Hurst and 
Stafford (2004) and Ziliak (1998)).45  Another possibility is that households could borrow 
using unsecured debt.  Sullivan (2009) finds that the use of unsecured debt during 
unemployment is a common means of smoothing consumption for low-asset households 
during unemployment although neither the poorest nor wealthiest households tend to 
smooth consumption using this market.   
Transfer programs and the structure of the tax system also serve as a means of 
smoothing consumption.  Programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program (SNAP) can be used by low income households during an unemployment spell.  
44 At the start of 2013, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina had maximum 
potential weeks of benefits between 20-25 weeks while Montana and Massachusetts offered maximums 
between 28-30 weeks. 
45 Hurst and Stafford (2004) note that it might be difficult for individuals to access home equity during an 
unemployment spell due to lending requirements.   
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Moreover, given SNAP's benefit reduction rate of 30%, households already receiving 
SNAP might be able to qualify for more generous benefits.  Programs such as Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) might 
further help individuals with children smooth consumption during unemployment.46  
Moreover, the tax code offers further protection to individuals from negative income 
shocks.  The progressive nature of the tax code means that reductions in earnings caused 
by unemployment will lead to larger changes in gross income than in net income, partly 
mitigating the decline in gross earnings (see Mankiw and Kimball (1992), Auerbach and 
Feenberg (2000), and Kniesner and Ziliak (2002)).  Moreover, unemployed individuals 
do not have to pay FICA taxes further mitigating their loss of income.  Hence, transfer 
programs and the tax code can help consumers smooth consumption when income losses 
occur due to unemployment.   
Given all the possible ways that households can smooth consumption, there is 
some question about the degree that UI smoothes consumption.  Historically, the degree 
to which UI smoothes consumption has been challenging to estimate given that few 
datasets provide comprehensive data on consumption.  To this point, the only dataset that 
contains comprehensive data on consumption dating back to the 1980s is the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CE).  However, the CE is a relatively short panel with households 
being interviewed for only 5 quarters and asks few questions regarding past earnings and 
employment which limits its usefulness in studying the consumption smoothing benefits 
46 Depending on an individual's earnings and number of children, reductions in earnings from 
unemployment could either increase or reduce the EITC benefit.  It is also possible to qualify for the EITC 
without children although the income limit for this is $14,820 for single individuals and heads of household 
and $20,330 for married couples in 2015 with a $503 maximum benefit, which is significantly smaller than 
the maximum benefit for individuals with children which ranges from $3,359 with one child to $6,242 with 
3 or more children.  For a further discussion of UI and the EITC, see LaLumia (2013). 
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of UI.  Another, more popular option in the literature has been to use longitudinal data 
from the PSID.  The PSID contains comprehensive data on earnings as well as food 
consumption and housing expenditure since the late 1960s and introduced more 
comprehensive consumption measures starting in 1999 that account for 72% of 
expenditure as captured in the CE (Charles, Danziger, Li, and Schoeni (2007)).    
The first paper to examine the consumption smoothing benefits of UI using the 
PSID was Gruber (1997).  Gruber uses the PSID from 1968-1987 to examine how 
unemployment insurance smoothes consumption for individuals that were employed at 
the time of the survey in year t-1 and unemployed at the time of the survey in year t.  For 
the analysis, Gruber uses food consumption (including SNAP benefits) as a proxy for 
total consumption.  To determine benefit amounts and monetary eligibility, Gruber uses 
wage earnings from the calendar year preceding the t-1 observation (before the employed 
year) and runs these earnings through a benefit calculator that determines UI eligibility 
and benefit amounts.  He finds that in the absence of UI, food consumption falls on 
average by approximately 22% while each 10 percentage-point increase in the 
replacement rate reduces the drop in consumption by 2.8%.   
Recent research has also extended Gruber's work using the PSID.  Kroft and 
Notowidigdo (2015) use the same dataset as Gruber (1997) to determine if the 
consumption smoothing benefits of UI vary throughout the business cycle.47  Kroft and 
Notowidigdo expand Gruber's model through interacting the replacement rate with the 
47 Kroft and Notowidigdo (2015) primarily analyze the effects of how replacement rates affect 
unemployment durations throughout the business cycle using the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation, although they also consider the consumption smoothing effects as well.  
A 
92 
state unemployment rate.  They find that the degree that UI smoothes consumption does 
not appear to vary throughout the business cycle.   
East and Kuka (2015) extend Gruber's analysis to the 1968-2011 period.  They 
use food consumption as a proxy for total consumption while also considering more 
comprehensive measures of consumption and use a model similar to Gruber's model to 
extend his results.  East and Kuka find that for their entire sample period from 1968-
2011, that a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement rate reduces the decline in 
consumption by 1.36% using their preferred specification and 1% using Gruber's 
specification with the latter not being statistically significant.  They then incorporate 
linear time trends and period fixed effects interacted with the replacement rate to argue 
that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI largely declined in the 1990s.  East and 
Kuka attribute this finding to reductions in UI generosity in the years following Gruber's 
analysis and having fewer unemployed individuals in the labor force which might lead to 
less generous UI benefits.    
Others have used Canadian and European data to examine the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI.  Browning and Crossley (2001) find that a 10% decrease in the 
replacement rate reduces total expenditure by 0.8% among Canadians.  Moreover, they 
find that variations in the replacement rate only affect the third of their sample that 
reported holding zero assets at the time of the job loss.  Bloemen and Stancanelli (2005) 
examine the consumption smoothing benefits of UI for food expenditure in Great Britain 
for the years 1983-1984.  Bloemen and Stancanelli find evidence that UI helps to smooth 
food consumption for households with zero financial wealth at the start of the 
unemployment spell.    
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Two fundamental questions have arisen in this literature following Gruber (1997).  
First, does UI smooth consumption for the general population of UI eligible individuals 
or are its consumption smoothing benefits limited to individuals that do not have other 
means of smoothing consumption such as having cash on hand at the start of the spell.  
Providing evidence from outside the U.S., Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bloemen 
and Stancanelli (2005) both find that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI are 
limited to individuals without liquid assets at the start of the spell.  However, answering 
this question using the PSID has historically been difficult as comprehensive measures of 
wealth were not asked prior to 1984 and were not asked every survey year until 1999.  
This has led several authors such as Gruber (1997), Kroft and Notowidigdo (2015), and 
East and Kuka (2015) to not address if the consumption smoothing benefits that they 
observe extend to all UI eligible individuals or just individuals that have zero liquid 
assets at the start of the spell. 
Second, total consumption might not respond the same way that food 
consumption does to changes in UI generosity.  Given that food consumption is only a 
small percentage of total consumption ranging from 10-15% of personal consumption 
over the 1968-2012 period (see Figure 4.1) and food is typically income inelastic, 
changes in food consumption could largely diverge from changes in total consumption 
during an unemployment spell.  Moreover, several stabilization programs are in place to 
stabilize food consumption such as SNAP, which could further cause changes in food 
consumption and total consumption to diverge.  Hence, it is also important to consider 
broader measures of consumption for determining the consumption smoothing benefits of 
UI. 
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Browning and Crossley (2001) use a comprehensive measure of consumption to 
find that a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement rate reduces the decline in 
consumption by only around 0.8% which is much smaller than Gruber's estimate of 2.8% 
using food consumption.  However, Browning and Crossley are using data from Canada 
where there is a national UI system that is fundamentally different from the U.S. system 
(as are other government transfer programs).  Given this, there is little empirical evidence 
regarding whether UI smoothes consumption for all of its recipients or just those who 
have no other means of smoothing consumption and the degree that UI smoothes 
consumption using more comprehensive measures of consumption.  This essay helps to 
bridge this gap through using more comprehensive measures of consumption and wealth 
while accounting for spousal labor income to determine if UI smoothes consumption for 
the entire population of eligible unemployed individuals and the degree that UI smoothes 
consumption. 
4.3  Model 
To determine the degree that UI smoothes consumption, I use a log-linearized 
Consumption Euler Equation under the assumption of constant relative risk aversion (see 
Hall (1978)).  The model takes the form: 
 (4.1)        ∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜓𝜓 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log of household consumption, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the respondent's after tax 
replacement rate, 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a vector of control variables including categorical controls for 
age (age groups 25-37, 38-49, and 50-61), categorical controls for education (high school 
dropout, high school degree, college dropout or associates degree, and bachelor's degree 
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or higher), gender, marital status, family size, number of children, and the after-tax real 
weekly wage, 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the state unemployment rate, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 are state and year fixed 
effects respectively, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the error term and is clustered at the state level. 48  
4.3.1  Imputed Total Consumption Following Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014) 
While much of the literature has used food consumption as a proxy for total 
consumption, it is likely that food consumption is less sensitive to changes in income 
than total consumption.  Given that the PSID has consistently collected certain types of 
consumption data (such as food) and started collecting more comprehensive consumption 
data in 1999, one possibility is to use the more recent data to impute types of 
consumption that were not observed prior to 1999.  To do this, I use a method similar to 
Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014).49   To generate the measure, I use the 1999-2013 waves 
of the PSID (for calendar years 1998-2012) where more comprehensive measures of 
consumption are available to estimate the equation: 
(4.2)  ln𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝛽𝛽 +  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝜑𝜑 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖;𝜃𝜃) +  𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where nit is net consumption (defined below), Zit are socioeconomic controls, pt are 
prices, fit includes components of consumption that have been consistently collected 
during each PSID interview (i.e. food at home, food away from home, and SNAP 
48 From 1980 forward I use state unemployment rates from the BLS.  Prior to this, I use state 
unemployment rates from Moffitt's Welfare Benefits Data Base which is available at 
http://www.econ2.jhu.edu/people/moffitt/datasets.html. 
49 The idea of imputing consumption builds off of Skinner (1987) who imputed total consumption in the 
PSID.  To impute consumption, Skinner used estimated coefficients from the CE which he calculated 
through regressing total consumption on a set of consumption series that are available in both surveys (ex. 
food, utilities, vehicles, etc.).  For other examples of papers that impute total consumption in the PSID, see 
Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008), Bronchetti (2012), Fisher and Johnson (2006), and Ziliak (1998). 
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benefits), g(.) is a cubic function, and eit is the error term.  The net consumption measure 
nit is the sum of housing costs (homeowners insurance, electricity, heating, water, and 
other utility cost), transportation costs (car insurance, car repairs, gasoline, parking, bus 
fares, taxi fares, and other transportation costs), expenditure on children (childcare, 
school tuition, and other school related expenses), health-related expenses (health 
insurance premiums and out-of-pocket healthcare expenses), and rent.  
Rent is calculated as annual rent expenditures for renters and for homeowners is 
calculated as 6% of the self-reported home value.  I then estimate Equation 4.2 on a 
sample of 34,445 person-year observations (employed and unemployed) from 1998-
2012.50  The constructed measure of imputed total consumption is then given by: 
(4.3)       Ĉ𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑝𝑝 {𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ?̂?𝛽 +  𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖  𝜑𝜑� + 𝑔𝑔�𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖;𝜃𝜃��} 
which I then convert into real terms using CPI.  
4.3.2  Liquidity and Spousal Labor Supply  
While the PSID has historically asked limited questions about wealth prior to 
1999, the PSID has always asked detailed questions regarding earnings and occasionally 
collected wealth data prior to 1999 and continuously each survey thereafter.  Given that 
wealth is not continuously asked prior to 1999, Zeldes (1989), Runkle (1991), and Ziliak 
(1998) use questions on interest, dividend, and rent income to estimate liquid assets. 
To determine if individuals have liquid assets, I follow an approach similar to 
Zeldes (1989).  Prior to 1992, the PSID asks a question about joint interest, dividend, and 
50 I also explore using only unemployed individuals which produces similar estimates, although they are 
noisier.   
A 
97 
rent income, which I use to determine if individuals have liquid assets.  Beginning in 
reference year 1992, the PSID asks individual questions about interest, dividend, and rent 
income.  For unemployment spells starting in 1992 or later, I use the questions on interest 
and dividend income to determine if individuals have liquid assets and exclude the rent 
income measure.   
To determine if UI benefits only smooth consumption for individuals without 
liquid assets at the start of the unemployment spell, I use Zeldes's measure of liquid 
assets to determine if individuals have liquid assets during their base period.  However, 
one limitation of this method is that I might not observe assets where little or no interest 
was earned which appears to be a problem after the Great Recession.  To address this 
problem, I use reported liquid assets when observed (for base periods in 1984, 1994, 
1999-2013) and Zeldes's method for base periods where this is not observed.  
Approximately half of households have liquid assets at the start of the spell using this 
method, which is similar to Chetty (2008) estimate of around 50% using panels in the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation from 1985-2000.51  To determine if the 
consumption smoothing benefits of UI are limited to individuals with no liquid assets at 
the start of the spell, I then estimate models of the form: 
(4.4)        ∆𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑒𝑒 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  + 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜓𝜓 + 𝜆𝜆 𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
for both food and imputed total consumption.  𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an indicator for whether an 
individual has no liquid assets.  I then interact this variable with the after tax replacement 
rate.  In certain specifications, I also stratify the sample based on whether the household 
51 Using Zeldes method throughout the entire period does not meaningfully change my main findings, 
although it does reduce the number of individuals that I observe with liquid assets in the 2000s. 
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has a working spouse.52  For the analysis, I define a working spouse as a spouse who was 
employed in the year of the respondent's base period and also had employment in the year 
the respondent was unemployed.53  All other variables maintain their prior definitions 
from Equation 4.1.    
4.4  Data 
To examine how UI smoothes consumption during unemployment spells, I use 
data from the PSID for the survey years 1968-2013 to analyze unemployment spells from 
1968-2012.54  The PSID is the world's longest running longitudinal household survey.  
Since 1968, the PSID has been following households in the original 1968 sample as well 
as households of descendants of the original 1968 sample.  The PSID followed 
households annually from 1968-1997 and biennially thereafter.  In all, the PSID has 
produced an unbalanced panel of 75,253 individuals between the years 1968-2013. 
Most questions in the PSID are asked retrospectively for the previous calendar 
year.  This includes questions such as earnings last year, weeks of employment and 
unemployment, and participation in transfer programs and benefit amounts.  The PSID 
also asks some questions that are specific to the time of the survey such as demographic 
variables and labor force status.  A benefit of this design is that it allows researchers to 
52 In these specifications, I exclude controls for gender and marital status as I focus my analysis on 
household heads whom the PSID defines as the male for a married couple given its origins from the late 
1960s. 
53 I require employment in both years for the spouse as I do not know the time of employment for the 
spouse.  Only requiring that the spouse be employed during the year the respondent was unemployed is 
problematic as the employment could come after the respondent was already reemployed. 
54 Since I am using the recall questions on employment status and only observe base period earnings in 
the year 1967 for individuals unemployed in 1968, my sample consists of individuals with unemployment 
spells from 1968-2012. 
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examine labor force transitions using either employment status from the previous year or 
from the time of the survey.   
For my analysis, I use the retrospective questions on employment because the 
timing of these questions correspond to the timing of the questions that I use to generate a 
more comprehensive measure of consumption and wealth.  I focus the analysis on prime 
age heads of households between the ages of 25 and 61 that reported at least 26 weeks of 
employment in year t-1 (with no weeks unemployed) and reported being unemployed in 
year t.55  I also exclude individuals that report being self-employed in year t-1 as this 
would often exclude them from being eligible for UI.  Individuals that are on layoff are 
also excluded from the analysis when possible since they might face different incentives 
and be more likely to anticipate the job loss relative to other UI eligible individuals (see 
Feldstein (1976), Feldstein (1978), and Topel (1983)).  Beginning in survey year 1976, 
the PSID distinguishes between individuals on temporary layoff and other types of 
unemployment, although this question is only asked at the time of the survey.  From 
1976-1996, I exclude individuals that reported in survey year t-1 that they were on layoff 
at the time of the survey.56  Starting in survey year 2003, it is possible to identify 
individuals that were laidoff in the previous year and I exclude these individuals from the 
analysis.   
Similar to Gruber (1997), I exclude observations where any component of food 
consumption is imputed or where the change in food consumption from the employed to 
the unemployed state is greater than threefold (in absolute value).  However, unlike 
55 This is a slightly stronger requirement than Gruber (1997) imposes.   
56 For example, if a respondent was on layoff at the time of the survey in 1990 and reported in survey year 
1991 being unemployed in 1990, I would exclude this observation from the analysis.    
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Gruber, I include only observations from the PSID main sample (The Survey Research 
Sample) and exclude observations from the Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) 
which is an oversample of low-income households following Attanasio and Pistaferri 
(2014) and Zeldes (1989).57  I also exclude observations where family size changes from 
the employed to unemployed state as this could lead to large changes in consumption that 
are not related to UI. 
Individuals meeting the criteria stated above are then run through a benefit 
calculator that determines monetary eligibility for UI.  To determine monetary eligibility, 
I use earnings from the prior year's survey, where the individual was employed at least 26 
weeks and never unemployed.  The benefit calculator is created using data from The 
Employment and Training Administration's "Significant Provisions of State 
Unemployment Insurance Laws" for each year from 1968-2012.   If an individual has 
sufficient earnings to qualify for UI then the program also calculates the individual's 
weekly benefit amount including any dependent allowances when applicable.58  Average 
replacement rates by state for 2012 are displayed in Figure 4.2.59  
57 This leads Gruber's sample to be lower income and predominantly minority (51.3% of Gruber's sample 
identifies as being black or being of another minority race), although Gruber does control for both income 
and race to partially account for this.   
 58 Dependent allowances are additional monetary payments made by states to eligible UI recipients who 
have qualifying dependents.  The states that pay dependent allowances at some point during the sample 
period are Alaska, District of Columbia, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New 
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee.  Dependent allowances can range 
from a minimum of $5 per week in Pennsylvania (with one qualifying dependent) up to $300 per week in 
Massachusetts (with twelve qualifying dependents; $25 per dependent).  
59 To generate these figures, I create simulated replacement rates following Gruber (1997) where I run my 
full sample through the benefit calculator for every state-year cell using real earnings adjusted using CPI 
and calculate the mean replacement rate for each state-year cell.  The rates can be viewed as a measure 
of relative generosity of UI benefits across states.  
A 
101 
There are three main advantages of using simulated eligibility and benefits rather 
than reported benefits.  First, UI take-up is endogenous.  As noted by Blank and Card 
(1991) take-up rates among eligibles are typically around 67%.  If take-up is correlated 
with consumption then using actual benefits received would lead to a biased coefficient 
estimate for the replacement rate.  Second, UI receipt is often unreported and misreported 
in survey data.  As noted by Meyer, Mok, and Sullivan (2009), UI receipt is often 
unreported with average yearly reporting rates of 73.8% in the PSID.  Third, 
policymakers determine eligibility rather than take-up.  Hence simulation based methods 
can help to address these concerns.  
However, one potential concern is that wages could be correlated with an 
individual's ability to smooth consumption.  For example, more generous replacement 
rates might be correlated with selection into unemployment.  To address these concerns, I 
use a two-step method used by Chetty (2008) where in the first stage I predict 
respondents' base period wages.  To do this, I use a log wage equation of the form: 
(4.5)     ln(𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1) =  𝛼𝛼 +   𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜋𝜋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 includes controls for age, age squared, education group, gender, major 
industry code, marital status, and the state unemployment rate, 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖  are year fixed effects, 
and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the robust error term.  I then recover the predicted wage in levels and run it 
through my benefit calculator.   
For the analysis, I use the after-tax real wage and replacement rate.  Tax rates are 
calculated using TAXSIM.60  Given that I am using data from 1968-2013, it is important 
60 I calculate tax rates using the federal marginal tax rate and FICA taxes from TAXSIM.  I exclude state 
taxes since TAXSIM does not calculate state tax rates prior to 1977. 
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to account for how UI is treated for tax purposes.  Prior to 1979, UI benefits were not 
treated as taxable income in the United States.  Starting in 1979, high-income earners' 
benefits became taxable and this was extended to mid-income earners in 1982.61  
Following the passage of The Tax Reform Act of 1986, UI benefits were treated as 
ordinary income (excluding FICA taxes) starting in 1987.  The implementation of taxing 
benefits has significantly reduced their value over time, ceteris paribus.  
Food consumption is then constructed as total money spent on food at home and 
away from home.  Purchases using food stamps are then added into this measure.  While 
questions about wages, income, and consumption are asked about the previous calendar 
year, there is some ambiguity regarding the timing of the food consumption questions.  
The ambiguity comes from the PSID asking respondents how much money they spend on 
food during a typical week.  This has led some researchers to assume the respondents 
report food expenditure for the first three months of the year given that surveys are 
typically conducted in March (Zeldes (1989), Gruber (1997), and East and Kuka (2015)) 
while others have assumed that it refers to the previous calendar year (Hall and Mishkin 
(1982), Dynarski and Shefrin (1987), and Blundell, Pistaferri, and Preston (2008)).  For 
the analysis, I assume that the food consumption question references the previous 
calendar year. 
After excluding individuals with insufficient base period earnings, there are 2,236 
individuals for the years 1968–2012.  Summary statistics are displayed in Table 4.2.  Real 
food expenditure chained in 2013 dollars was $9,321 for the 1968-2012 period and 
declined throughout the period which is consistent with Figure 4.1.  After-tax 
61 For a further discussion of the tax treatment of UI benefits prior to The Tax Reform Act of 1986, see 
Solon (1985).  
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replacement rates averaged 49.9% for the 1968-1986 period and 49.4% for the entire 
sample period.  This is smaller than Gruber (1997) and East and Kuka (2015) average 
replacement rate of 57% for the 1968-1986 period although they include the SEO 
oversample of low-income individuals who typically have larger replacement rates.  The 
average age of individuals in the sample is 39 years for the 1968-2012 period given that I 
am focusing on prime age workers between the ages of 25-61 at the time of the spell.  
Females make-up 13.7% of the sample for the 1968-1986 period and their share rises to 
17.3% for the 1998-2012 period.62  Marriage rates averaged 77.4% for the 1968-1986 
period and declined in more recent years to average 69.4% throughout the 1968-2012 
period.  In terms of racial composition, the sample is 87.3% white, 9.7% black, while 3% 
are from other races.  Mean education throughout the 1968-2012 period is 12.58 years 
which increases over time.   
4.5  Baseline Estimates 
The baseline estimates for Equation 4.1 using the actual replacement rate are 
displayed in Table 4.3.  The first specification estimates Gruber (1997) model using my 
data for the 1968-1986 period.  The results suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in 
the replacement rate reduces the decline in consumption by 3.08% which is slightly larger 
than Gruber's estimate of 2.80%.  The result is similar to my preferred specification for 
the same period which includes categorical controls for age and education.  For my 
62 There are three main reasons why females compose only 17% of the sample.  First, female labor force 
participation rates were much lower in the earlier years of the sample.  Second, I am limiting my analysis to 
heads of households which the PSID defines as the male for a married couple.  Third, UI eligibility is lower 
for females than males (conditional upon unemployment) due to females being less likely to have sufficient 
base period earnings to qualify for UI. 
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preferred specification, the results suggest that a 10 percentage-point increase in the 
replacement rate reduces the decline in food consumption by 3.11% for the 1968-1986 
period, 2.07% for the 1968-1996 period, and 2.45% for the entire sample period from 
1968-2012. 
In contrast to East and Kuka (2015) finding that UI no longer helps recipients 
smooth consumption, the results suggest that UI helps to smooth consumption for my 
sample of prime age individuals for the entire sample period.  While I am interpreting the 
timing of the food consumption question differently from Gruber (1997) and East and 
Kuka (2015) and using the recall questions on employment rather than the employment 
status at the time of the survey, sample heterogeneity might be driving these differences 
where I am focusing on prime age workers between the ages of 25-61 with at least 26 
weeks of employment during their base period with sufficient earnings to qualify for UI 
and were not self-employed during their base period which would generally exclude them 
from receiving UI.  Gruber (1997) and East and Kuka (2015) appear to include household 
heads of all ages and are not excluding self-employed individuals.  When I drop these 
restrictions, my results become fairly similar to East and Kuka's for the entire sample 
period.   
4.5.1  Wealth and Spousal Labor Supply 
The degree that UI smoothes consumption likely depends on whether households 
have other means of smoothing consumption.  Two of the primary ways that households 
can smooth consumption is through having liquid assets and through having an employed 
spouse.  The latter captures that respondents with employed spouses see smaller 
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percentage declines in household income and the idea that these households should be 
able to borrow against the spouse's labor income.  Table 4.4 displays the estimates from 
Equation 4.4 which adds a control for having zero-liquid assets at the spell start date into 
the model as well as an interaction between having zero-liquid assets and the after-tax 
replacement rate for the 1968-2012 period and the 1968-1996 period.  The table also 
reports estimates stratified by whether the recipient had a working spouse using both the 
actual and predicted replacement rates.  The results suggest that UI offers large 
consumption smoothing benefits for the 27% of households that do not have liquid assets 
and have no working spouse.  For the full sample using the actual replacement rate for 
the 1968-2012 period, a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement rate reduces the 
decline in consumption by 1.55% for those with liquid assets at the spell start date and 
3.16% for those with zero liquid assets (evaluated at the mean).    
However examining the stratified sample for the 1968-2012 period, the results 
suggest that this is largely driven by the 27% of households that do not have liquid assets 
and have no working spouse.  For the stratified sample of households without a working 
spouse, a 10 percentage-point increase in the respondent's replacement rate reduces the 
decline in household consumption by 1.08% for those with liquid assets at the spell start 
date and 4.92% for those with zero liquid assets.  Moreover, for these households, having 
zero liquid assets at the spell start date is associated with a 21% decline in consumption, 
ceteris paribus.  For households with a working spouse, a 10 percentage-point increase in 
the respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in household consumption by 
1.67% for those with liquid assets at the spell start date and .75% for those with zero 
liquid assets, with neither coefficient being statistically significant.  For these households, 
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having zero liquid assets at the spell start date is associated with a 2.1% decline in 
consumption, ceteris paribus, which is significantly smaller than the 21% decline for 
households without a working spouse.         
Using the predicted replacement rate in place of the actual replacement rate 
produces similar results.  The results suggest that the consumption smoothing benefits of 
UI are concentrated on the set of households with zero liquid assets at the spell start date 
that do not have a working spouse.  For households without a working spouse, a 10 
percentage-point increase in the respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in 
household consumption by -1.02% for those with liquid assets at the spell start date 
which is not statistically significant and 3.45% for those with zero liquid assets.  For 
households with a working spouse and no liquid assets, a 10 percentage-point increase in 
the respondent's replacement rate is associated with no change in household consumption 
using the predicted replacement rate.    
4.5.2 Wealth, Spousal Labor Supply, and Imputed Total Consumption 
Given that total consumption might not respond in the same way that food 
consumption does to changes in UI, I impute total consumption using a procedure based 
on Attanasio and Pistaferri (2014).  Table 4.5 displays the estimates from Equation 4.4 
using imputed total consumption for both the actual replacement rate and the predicted 
replacement rate.  Using the actual replacement rate, the results vary relative to the 
estimates in Table 4.4 in that the estimates suggest that UI offers more consumption 
smoothing benefits to the eligible population of households as a whole and not just 
households with zero liquid assets at the spell start date.  For the full sample using the 
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observed wage and imputed total consumption, a 10 percentage-point increase in the 
respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in household consumption by 1.54% 
for those with liquid assets at the spell start date and 1.71% for those with zero liquid 
assets (evaluated at the mean).  For households with no working spouse, a 10    
percentage-point increase in the respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in 
household consumption by 1.33% for those with liquid assets at the spell start date and 
2.09% for those with zero liquid assets.   
Using the predicted replacement rate, the results suggest that the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI are concentrated on the set of households without liquid assets 
that do not have a working spouse, which is similar to the results using food 
consumption.  For households without a working spouse, a 10 percentage-point increase 
in the respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in household consumption by -
.4% for those with liquid assets at the spell start date which is not statistically significant 
and 1.51% for those with zero liquid assets which is statistically significant.   
The consumption smoothing benefits for households without other means of 
smoothing consumption are smaller using imputed total consumption rather than food 
consumption.  For these households, a 10 percentage-point increase in the respondent's 
replacement rate reduces the decline in household consumption by between 3.5-4.9% 
using food consumption and 1.5-2.1% using imputed total consumption.  The difference 
could be explained by households putting their first dollars towards food, which is 
consistent with food expenditure typically having an income elasticity of demand of 
around .6 which is lower than the income elasticity of demand of most other goods.  This 
is consistent with Dynarski and Gruber's (1997) finding that food consumption is less 
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responsive than total consumption during transitions from employment to unemployment 
using the CE.  However, both my measures of consumption suggest that UI helps 
households smooth consumption for households that do not have other means of 
smoothing consumption. 
4.5.3  Declines over Time? 
The past literature that has examined the consumption smoothing benefits of UI 
has found large consumption smoothing effects in the years through the late 1980s.  East 
and Kuka (2015), extend Gruber's analysis and find large declines in the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI in the 1990s that causes all but one of their nine such 
specifications to show that UI has no statistically significant consumption smoothing 
effect for the 1968-2011 period.  They then decompose this effect by interacting decade 
fixed effects with the replacement rate to determine when the declines that they observe 
in the consumption smoothing benefits of UI occur.  East and Kuka observe extremely 
large declines in the consumption smoothing benefits of UI in the 1990s. 
However, I find large consumption smoothing benefits from UI that are 
statistically significant using models that include and exclude liquidity for the 1968-2012 
period.  To test if the consumption smoothing benefits of UI declined in the 1990s, I 
estimate Equation 4.1 and Equation 4.4 while including interaction terms for the decade 
interacted with the actual replacement rate which is similar to East and Kuka (2015) 
using food consumption for my entire sample and for a stratified sample based on having 
an employed spouse.63   
63 I also do this using imputed total consumption (available upon request) and obtain similar results to the 
estimates using food consumption where the time period interaction terms are statistically insignificant.  
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The results are displayed in Table 4.6.  Few of the coefficients on replacement 
rate interacted with the time periods are statistically significant and I find no evidence of 
large declines in the 1990s after The Tax Reform Act of 1986 made UI benefits fully 
taxable.  Moreover, each of the six F-Tests fail to reject that the coefficients on 
replacement rate interacted with the time periods are jointly equal to zero.  Overall, I find 
little evidence that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI declined in the 1990s. 
4.6  Conclusion      
This essay examines how liquidity and spousal income affect the consumption 
smoothing benefits of UI.  Using food consumption and imputed total consumption, I use 
the PSID from 1968-2012 to show that the consumption smoothing benefits of UI are 
primarily concentrated on the set of households with zero-liquid assets at the spell start 
date that do not have a wage earning spouse.  For these 27% of households, a 10 
percentage-point increase in the respondent's replacement rate reduces the decline in 
household consumption by between 3.5-4.9% using food consumption and 1.5-2.1% 
using imputed total consumption.  However, for households with liquid assets or an 
employed spouse, UI offers much smaller consumption smoothing benefits and offers no 
consumption smoothing benefits for the 24% of households with liquid assets and an 
employed spouse.  Moreover, I find no evidence that the consumption smoothing benefits 
of UI have declined over time. 
The results suggest that UI offers large consumption smoothing benefits for 
liquidity constrained recipients, which is presumably the group that policymakers care 
about most.  Moreover, the results are important for estimating optimal unemployment 
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benefits using the Baily-Chetty formula where the decline in consumption as a function 
of UI benefits is one of the three key parameters in determining optimal benefit amounts 
(see Baily (1978) and Chetty (2006)).  The results suggest that liquidity constrained UI 
recipients have higher optimal replacement rates than less liquidity constrained 
recipients, ceteris paribus, which is something that policymakers could consider when 
designing benefit schedules. 
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Figure 4.1: Food Expenditure in the United States
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Figure 4.2: Average Simulated Replacement Rate: 
by State for 2012 
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Table 4.1 - UI Benefits in Dollars and Weeks by State for 2013a
State Min-WBA Max-WBA Average WBA Average Weekly Wage Min-Weeks Max-Weeks
Alabama 45 265 207 794 15 26
Alaska 56 370 250 965 16 26
Arizona 122 240 221 866 12 26
Arkansas 81 451 289 736 9 25
California 40 450 301 1,083 14 26
Colorado 25 466 356 978 13 26
Connecticut 15 591 345 1,230 26 26
Delaware 20 330 245 1,002 24 26
D.C. 50 359 299 1,523 19 26
Florida 32 275 231 822 12 23
Georgia 44 330 267 909 6 20
Hawaii 5 534 424 781 26 26
Idaho 72 357 264 693 10 26
Ill inois 51 413 324 1,016 26 26
Indiana 37 390 243 799 8 26
Iowa 59 396 337 780 7 26
Kansas 114 456 341 791 10 26
Kentucky 39 415 292 773 15 26
Louisiana 10 247 207 849 26 26
Maine 65 372 285 718 22 26
Maryland 50 430 329 996 26 26
Massachusetts 33 674 424 1,197 10 30
Michigan 117 362 293 899 14 20
Minnesota 24 393 376 970 11 26
Mississippi 30 235 194 683 13 26
Missouri 35 320 242 824 8 20
Montana 127 446 290 695 8 28
Nebraska 70 362 276 746 12 26
Nevada 16 402 308 822 12 26
New Hampshire 32 427 287 941 26 26
New Jersey 87 624 398 1,141 1 26
New Mexico 76 407 303 750 16 26
New York 64 405 308 1,276 26 26
North Carolina 46 535 290 833 13 26
North Dakota 43 516 396 947 12 26
Ohio 115 413 318 847 20 26
Oklahoma 16 386 293 809 18 26
Oregon 122 524 316 843 3 26
Pennsylvania 70 573 360 934 18 26
Rhode Island 45 566 351 870 15 26
South Carolina 42 326 248 747 13 20
South Dakota 28 333 276 680 15 26
Tennessee 30 275 235 843 13 26
Texas 62 440 341 999 10 26
Utah 26 479 345 794 10 26
Vermont 69 425 313 780 21 26
Virginia 54 378 295 990 12 26
Washington 143 604 387 1,012 1 26
West Virginia 24 424 275 748 26 26
Wisconsin 54 363 276 803 14 26
Wyoming 33 459 359 859 11 26
a. Minimum and maximum values for benefits and potential weeks of benefits are as of January 1, 2013.
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All Years
Period 1968-1986 1968-1996 1968-2012
Real Food Expenditurea $10,096 $9,901 $9,321
Imputed Consumptiona $35,327 $34,499 $33,057
After-Tax Replacement Rate 0.499 0.492 0.494
After-Tax Real Weekly Wagea $717 $705 $708
Age 38.2 38.3 38.8
Female 13.7% 15.1% 17.3%
Married 77.5% 74.0% 69.4%
White 88.4% 88.5% 87.3%
Black 8.9% 8.8% 9.7%
Other 2.6% 2.8% 3.0%
Years of Education 11.8 12.2 12.6
Family Size 3.2 3.1 2.9
Number of Children 1.2 1.2 1.1
State Unemployment Rate 0.069 0.067 0.066
Δ Log Food Consumption -0.026 -0.026 -0.029
Δ Log Imputed Consumption -0.055 -0.054 -0.057
Has Liquid Assets 38.3% 41.6% 51.4%
Has Employed Spouse 45.8% 47.1% 45.7%
Renter 32.0% 35.0% 36.9%
N 1,141 1,588 2,236
Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for UI Eligible Individuals
Subsample Periods 
Notes: a: All dollar values are chained in 2013 dollars using CPI.  The sample includes UI eligible PSID respondents 
age 25-61 that were employed at least 26 weeks in survey year t-1 and unemployed in survey year t.  The sample 
excludes respondents who were self-employed during their base period, those on layoff, observations where the 
change in food consumption from the employed to unemployed state is greater than threefold (in absolute value), 
SEO observations, and observations where family size changes between the employed and unemployed state. 
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Specification Gruber Model
Years 1968-1986 1968-1986 1968-1996 1968-2012
After-Tax Replacement Rate 0.308*** 0.311*** 0.207*** 0.245***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.07)   
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Drop in Consumption without UI 18.2% 18.2% 12.8% 15.3%
N 1,143 1,143 1,588 2,236
Table 4.3: Baseline Results- The Effect of UI on Food Consumption 
Baseline Model
Notes: The sample includes UI eligible PSID respondents age 25-61 that were employed at least 26 weeks in survey year t-1 
and unemployed in survey year t.  The sample excludes respondents who were self-employed during their base period, those 
on layoff, observations where the change in food consumption from the employed to unemployed state is greater than threefold 
(in absolute value), SEO observations, and observations where family size changes between the employed and unemployed 
state.  Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  For the Replacement and Unemployment 
Rates: .01=1%.  * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, 
respectively.
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Sample
Full 
Sample
No Working 
Spouse
Working 
Spouse
Full Sample No Working 
Spouse
Working 
Spouse
1968-2012
After-Tax Replacement Rate (RR) 0.155* 0.108 0.167 -0.084 -0.102 -0.032
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.19) (0.15)
No Liquid Assets x RR 0.161* 0.384*** -0.092 0.274** 0.447*** 0.033
(0.09) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14) (0.18)
No Liquid Assets -0.098* -0.208** 0.021 -0.156** -0.250*** -0.039
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent with No Liquid Assets 48.6% 49.0% 47.3% 48.6% 49.0% 47.3%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 with Assets 9.95% 8.17% 9.61% -1.23% -1.76% -0.56%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 without Assets 18.46% 25.64% 7.71% 12.23% 19.08% -3.93%
P-Value: RR + No Liquid Assets x RR =0 0.0002 0.0005 0.4694  0.0465 0.0249 0.9916
N  2,236 1,215  1,021  2,236 1,215  1,021
1968-1996
After-Tax Replacement Rate (RR) 0.022 -0.052 0.206 -0.037 -0.118 0.146
(0.10) (0.14) (0.18) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19)
No Liquid Assets x RR 0.284*** 0.537*** -0.065 0.308** 0.488** 0.028
(0.10) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15) (0.19) (0.22)
No Liquid Assets -0.165*** -0.291*** -0.010 -0.183** -0.286*** -0.054
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.11)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent with No Liquid Assets 58.1% 58.4% 57.8% 58.1% 58.4% 57.8%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 with Assets 3.46% 0.46% 10.47% 0.54% -3.37% 8.25%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 without Assets 18.07% 25.68% 11.14% 16.4% 20.48% 12.79%
P-Value: RR + No Liquid Assets x RR =0  0.0005  0.0015  0.2154  0.0157  0.0341 0.3591
N 1,588 840 748 1,588 840 748
Table 4.4: The Effect of UI on Food Consumption with Liquidity 
Replacement Rate Predicted Replacement Rate
Notes: The sample includes UI eligible PSID respondents age 25-61 that were employed at least 26 weeks in survey year t-1 and unemployed in 
survey year t.  The sample excludes respondents who were self-employed during their base period, those on layoff, observations where the change 
in food consumption from the employed to unemployed state is greater than threefold (in absolute value), SEO observations, and observations where 
family size changes between the employed and unemployed state.  Regressions are run with robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  For 
the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: .01=1%.  * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% 
confidence level, respectively.
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Sample 
Full 
Sample
No Working 
Spouse
Working 
Spouse
Full Sample No Working 
Spouse
Working 
Spouse
After-Tax Replacement Rate (RR) 0.154*** 0.133* 0.160 0.001 -0.040 0.092
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11)
No Liquid Assets x RR 0.017 0.076 -0.055 0.084 0.191** -0.094
(0.06) (0.07) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.11)
No Liquid Assets -0.026 -0.056 0.009 -0.058 -0.118*** 0.030
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent with No Liquid Assets 48.6% 49.0% 47.3% 48.6% 49.0% 47.3%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 with Assets 12.37% 13.30% 11.73% 5.45% 5.23% 8.94%
Consumption Decline: RR=0 without Assets 14.32% 16.71% 11.30% 9.97% 14.23% 5.79%
N  2,236 1,215  1,021  2,236 1,215  1,021
P-Value: RR + No Liquid Assets x RR =0  0.0022  0.0017 0.1653 0.1113  0.0706 0.9844
Table 4.5: The Effect of UI on Imputed Total Consumption with Liquidity 
Replacement Rate Predicted Replacement Rate
Notes: The sample includes UI eligible PSID respondents age 25-61 that were employed at least 26 weeks in survey year t-1 and unemployed 
in survey year t.  The sample excludes respondents who were self-employed during their base period, those on layoff, observations where the 
change in food consumption from the employed to unemployed state is greater than threefold (in absolute value), SEO observations, and 
observations where family size changes between the employed and unemployed state.  Regressions are run with robust clustered standard 
errors at the state level.  For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: .01=1%.  * ** *** indicate coefficient is statistically different from 
zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively.
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Table 4.6: The Consumption Smoothing Effects of Unemployment Insurance Over Time: 1968-2012
Sample
After Tax Replacement Rate  (RR) 0.201** 0.020 0.263* -0.141 0.010 0.092
(0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.20)
No Liquid Assets x RR 0.254** 0.572*** -0.110
(0.12) (0.14) (0.20)
No Liquid Assets -0.132** -0.272*** 0.013
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) 
RR x 1977-1986 Period 0.050 0.079 0.060 0.169 0.140 0.078
(0.11) (0.14) (0.17) (0.22) (0.17) (0.19)
RR x 1990-1996 Period -0.021 0.119 0.045 0.236 0.026 0.078
(0.14) (0.15) (0.28) (0.30) (0.21) (0.25)
RR x 1998-2012 Period 0.232* 0.350* 0.251 0.557* 0.232 0.114
(0.14) (0.19) (0.25) (0.28) (0.22) (0.28)
No Liquid Assets x RR x 1977-1986 Period -0.006 -0.076 0.073
(0.09) (0.13) (0.13)
No Liquid Assets x RR x 1990-1996 Period -0.087 -0.060 -0.067
(0.09) (0.12) (0.18)
No Liquid Assets x RR x 1998-2012 Period -0.006 -0.086 0.146
(0.10) (0.14) (0.17)
1977-1986 Period 0.062 0.133 0.179 0.143 0.128 0.141
(0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19)
1990-1996 Period 0.180 0.141 0.014 -0.064 -0.034 -0.041
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) (0.18) (0.17)
1998-2012 Period -0.105 -0.167* -0.019 -0.156 -0.060 -0.031
(0.09) (0.09) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
P-Value: All Interactions with RR jointly =0 0.2435 0.2668 0.4690 0.3445 0.4989 0.5799
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State and Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N  2,236  2,236 1,215 1,215  1,021  1,021
Full Sample No Working Spouse Working Spouse
Notes: The sample includes UI eligible PSID respondents age 25-61 that were employed at least 26 weeks in survey year t-1 and 
unemployed in survey year t.  The sample excludes respondents who were self-employed during their base period, those on layoff, 
observations where the change in food consumption from the employed to unemployed state is greater than threefold (in absolute value), 
SEO observations, and observations where family size changes between the employed and unemployed state.  Regressions are run with 
robust clustered standard errors at the state level.  For the Replacement and Unemployment Rates: .01=1%.  * ** *** indicate 
coefficient is statistically different from zero at the 90%, 95%, and 99% confidence level, respectively.
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ARRA Policy Appendix 
Alternative Base Periods 
Traditionally most states have used earnings test that consist of the first four of the last 
five completed calendar quarters before the claim filing date which excludes an 
individual’s three to six most recent months of earnings (see Figure 3.6).  Traditionally 
many states excluded the most recent quarter of earnings over concerns that this quarter 
might not accurately represent workers earnings.  However, 38 states and the District of 
Columbia now recalculate monetary eligibility for individuals that don’t qualify for UI 
under traditional base periods using an alternative base period that consists of the four 
most recent completed calendar quarters preceding the filing of the claim (see Figure 
3.7).  This represents a historical change for many states as only 6 states had alternative 
base periods in 1995: Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and 
Washington (Vroman, 1995).  However several states have added alternative base periods 
since this time.  Today, 38 states and Washington DC have implemented alternative base 
periods.      
Dependent Allowances  
Dependent Allowances are monetary payments made by states to eligible UI recipients 
who have qualifying dependents.  Currently 14 states offer dependent allowances which 
range from a minimum of $5 per week in Pennsylvania (with 1 qualifying dependent) up 
to $300 per week in Massachusetts (with 12 qualifying dependents; $25 per dependent).  
These are paid for dependents which include unmarred biological children under the age 
of 18 and in some states spouses, older children, parents, as well as other qualifying 
dependents as defined by state laws.  Dependent Allowances are interesting because they 
raise UI recipients’ replacement rates which could potentially increase the spell length of 
dependent allowance recipients and could lead to a substitution towards more household 
production given the family demographics of this group.   Dependent Allowances have a 
long history as a component of several state unemployment systems. By 1951, ten states 
and the District of Columbia paid dependent allowances (Halsey). These states are 
Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Wyoming, as well as the District of Columbia.  Today, Arizona, Nevada, 
North Dakota, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia no longer offer dependent 
allowances, while Illinois, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and 
Tennessee have implemented dependent allowances.     
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Part-Time Workers 
Finally, many states require unemployed individuals to be available for and actively seek 
full-time employment to qualify and remain on UI.  To see the magnitude of this consider 
Wisconsin which, like many other state, asks unemployed individuals the question about 
the week that they are trying to claim benefits: 
Were you able to work full-time and available for full-time work? 
Answer "YES" if you could have and would have worked full-time if work had 
been available for you. 
Answer “NO” if you could not work full-time because you were physically unable 
to work or you were unavailable for work. For example, you could not accept 
work with an employer (including your regular employer) because you were sick 
or injured, on vacation, didn’t have a way to get to work, didn’t have childcare 
arrangements, etc. -- January 2013 
Answering no to the above question will often result in a denial by a state to pay an 
unemployment claim.  Such clauses often mean that many part-time workers have to be 
able to work full-time hours to be eligible for UI, even though the reason that many of 
these workers are part-time is because they cannot work full-time hours or chose not to.  
Twenty eight states and the District of Columbia currently exclude available for and 
seeking full-time work requirements for individuals with a history of part-time 
employment.     
Voluntary Job Leavers   
Essentially all states have provisions that allow for voluntary job leavers to receive 
unemployment benefits for compelling reasons.  The major variance among states is what 
is considered a compelling reason.  Compelling reasons can include providing care for ill 
family members, victims of sexual assault or domestic violence, or who became 
unemployed due to moving with a spouse who has relocated for employment purposes, as 
well as other reasons depending on the state.  As can be seen in Table 3.2, many states 
accepted UI modernization funds to expand coverage to individuals with compelling 
family reasons.  After the modernizations, 24 states offered benefits to voluntary job 
leavers with compelling reasons for the reasons outlined above.    
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Benefit Calculator Appendix 
The benefit calculator is created using data from The Employment and Training 
Administration's "Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws" for 
each year from 1997-2012.  The data provides each state’s eligibility requirements and 
the algorithms to determine benefit amounts.  The eligibility requirements typically 
require that recipients have a certain amount of earnings to qualify for UI (see Table 3.1 
for 2012) that often must occur during multiple quarters during the respondent’s base 
period.  For benefit amounts, I use the data to determine base period earnings which are 
then used to determine each respondent’s benefit amount.  Benefit amounts are capped at 
some maximum and minimum level which are displayed in Table 3.1 for 2012.   
To determine UI eligibility, I first determine the dates of each unemployed respondent’s 
base period using their spell start date.  The SIPP provides monthly earnings for each 
respondent and monthly earnings from wages during the base period are used to 
determine UI eligibility and benefit amounts.  Replacement rates are then calculated as 
the ratio of the weekly benefit amount to the average weekly wage during the 
respondent’s base period.   
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